Piden conservación de bosques urbanos

NATURALEZA. También que sea valorizada el agua

Piden conservación de bosques urbanos

Grupos ecologistas que el pasado lunes, conmemoraron el Día Nacional de los Bosques Urbanos, exigen respeto a ley del ambiente.

Melquisedec Quintero
PA-DIGITAL

Flora. Importante fomentar la arborización en la ciudad.

La aparición de peces muertos flotando en ríos, proyectos mineros, así como la proliferación de construcciones en la metrópoli, preocupan a sectores de la sociedad civil, en particular los ambientalistas.

Entre estos grupos están la Alianza para la Conservación y el Desarrollo (ACD), el Centro de Incidencia Ambiental (CIAM), en conjunto con el Centro de Estudio de Recursos Bióticos (CEREB), han mancomunado esfuerzos en la lucha por conservar los bosques, paralelo a la valorización del agua como recurso hídrico.

Raiza Banfield, directora del CIAM, solicitó al Gobierno una postura más enérgica en materia de normas que regulen la actividad de los grandes inmobiliarias, las que a su juicio ponen en peligro el ecosistema de las áreas boscosas cercanas a los lugares en construcción.

En este sentido, Susana Serracín, abogada ambientalista cuestionó la labor de la Asociación Nacional del Ambiente (ANAM), debido a que muchos de lo proyectos en el país, no cumplen los requisitos que establece la ley sobre preservación del ambiente.

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El Centro de Incidencia Ambiental, la Alianza para la Conservación y el Desarrollo y la Universidad de Panamá , Centro de Estudios de Recursos Bióticos, en reciente ceremonia en el Museo Reina Torres de Araúz, otorgaron reconocimiento a un grupo de comunicadores que han apoyado la defensa del agua, de los ríos y de los bosques de Panamá. La periodista Malema De León, de Panamá América, recibió la distinción por sus trabajos periodísticos sobre la protección del agua.

Carmencita Tedman, Cecilia MacIntyre ( en representación de Juan B. Gómez) y Carlos E. Rangel.

Carmencita Tedman, Cecilia MacIntyre ( en representación de Juan B. Gómez) y Carlos E. Rangel.

Malema De León, Raúl Carranza y Raisa Banfield.

Malema De León, Raúl Carranza y Raisa Banfield.

Alejandro Balaguer y Raisa Banfield.

Alejandro Balaguer y Raisa Banfield.

Ariel Rodríguez y Miguel Hidalgo

Ariel Rodríguez y Miguel Hidalgo

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Exploración minera en cerro Chorcha no tiene EIA

Exploración en cerro Chorcha no tiene EIA

Manuel Paredes LA PRENSA/Archivo

Mónica Palm
UNIDAD DE INVESTIGACIÓN
mpalm@prensa.com

Cuprum Resources Corporation realiza exploraciones mineras en cerro Chorcha, sin contar con un estudio de impacto ambiental (EIA) aprobado.

Algunas de estas exploraciones afectan dos áreas protegidas y de gran biodiversidad: el Bosque Protector de Palo Seco y la reserva forestal de Fortuna.

La Dirección de Evaluación y Ordenamiento Ambiental de la Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente (Anam) indicó ayer que el EIA categoría I –el más laxo de todos, puesto que no exige consulta ciudadana– que Cuprum presentó en diciembre de 2008, está pendiente de aprobación.

Cuprum recién presentó el EIA, a pesar de que su concesión minera está vigente desde el 4 de abril de 2006. La concesión para explorar 24.2 hectáreas es por cuatro años, renovables.

La Alianza para la Conservación y el Desarrollo denunció ante la Anam que los trabajos de exploración los realiza la empresa Dominion Minerals Corporation, quien tiene un “acuerdo” privado con Cuprum para adquirir hasta el 75% del proyecto en cerro Chorcha.

El ejecutivo principal (CEO) de Dominion es Manuel José Paredes, quien, como viceministro de Comercio, entregó la concesión a Cuprum en 2006.

Trabajos en cerro Chorcha son ilegales

Mónica Palm
mpalm@prensa.com

La Alianza para la Conservación y el Desarrollo ha requerido a la Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente, que dirige la ministra Ligia Castro, que investigue las “exploraciones ilegales” que desarrollan Dominion Minerals y Cuprum Resources Corporation –una subsidiaria de Bellahaven Copper & Gold–, en la provincia de Chiriquí, y la comarca Ngöbe Buglé, específicamente, en el área de cerro Chorcha.

Estos trabajos de exploración mineral se dan en un área en la que confluyen el Bosque Protector de Palo Seco y la Reserva Forestal de Fortuna, detalló Ariel Rodríguez, secretario de asuntos ambientales de la Alianza.

“¿Cómo es posible que se realicen concesiones mineras en áreas prístinas, protegidas y frágiles en cerro Chorcha, sin haber realizado una evaluación estratégica de la política minera en Panamá, como lo manda la legislación ambiental vigente”, se preguntó Rodríguez.

En diciembre, Cuprum presentó un estudio de impacto ambiental, que Anam todavía no ha aprobado.

Hace un mes, Rodríguez solicitó a Castro que multara a los responsables de estos trabajos, que suspendiera cualquier actividad en el área y que solicitara una investigación por delitos ambientales al Ministerio Público. El biólogo no ha obtenido respuesta alguna por parte de Castro. Este diario tampoco pudo hablar con la ministra, pese a que se le dejaron dos mensajes.

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ADEMÁS:  Revise los planes mineros en Cerro Chorcha

http://www.bellhavencg.com/inc/projects/cerro-chorcha/94-maps-cerro-chorcha.html
http://www.dominionminerals.com/Projects/Cerro/

ACD informó al relator de violación de derechos humanos en Changuinola

Entregan informe al Relator de la ONU sobre pueblos indígenas  de la violación de los derechos humanos al Pueblo Ngobe en el valle del Rio Changuinola

BURICA PRESS – Derechos Humanos

La Alianza para la Conservación y el Desarrollo (ACD) ha emitido un informe abierto dirigido al Relator Especial de la ONU para pueblos indígenas, Dr. James Anaya, donde destacan en un resumen los principales hechos que según esta organización ameritan ser considerados por el Relator.

ACD planteó en el informe denominado Violaciones de los derechos humanos al pueblo Ngobe en Panamá que este pueblo ha estado sometido a acciones de represión injustificada y omisiones del Estado panameño en su contra y planteó varios casos emblemáticos que demuestran la forma en que se viola de manera sistemática los Derechos Humanos del pueblo Ngobe que Burica Press reproduce integralmente a continuación:

En las comunidades del Valle del Río Changuinola en la Provincia de Bocas del Toro, conformadas por miles de personas, se han suscitado una serie de abusos y violaciones a los Derechos Humanos del pueblo Ngobe, por parte del Estado panameño con la participación de AES Corporation, cuyas filiales en Panamá son AES Panamá y AES Changuinola. El Estado le ha otorgado la concesión para la construcción de tres hidroeléctricas en el Río Changuinola: Chan-75, Chan-140 y Chan-220, ubicadas en el Bosque Protector Palo Seco, zona de amortiguamiento del Parque Internacional La Amistad, que forma parte de la Reserva de la Biosfera, Patrimonio Mundial de la Humanidad. Sólo con la construcción de la primera, Chan 75, y con la modificación de su altura a 165 metros, se prevé la inundación de cuatro comunidades indígenas.

I. El Gobierno de Panamá continúa violando el Derecho de las comunidades Ngöbe de otorgar su consentimiento libre, previo e informado relacionado al uso de su territorio y su reubicación.

A. El Estado no demostró haber garantizado un proceso de consulta adecuado para obtener el consentimiento previo, libre e informado de la población Ngöbe.

La gran mayoría de las reuniones con las comunidades se han realizado a posteriori del otorgamiento de la concesión para la construcción del proyecto y de la concesión del Bosque Protector Palo Seco a AES Changuinola y después de iniciados los trabajos de construcción. En otras palabras, estas reuniones de consulta sólo evalúan aspectos secundarios al proyecto, por ejemplo, el tipo de casa que desean sea construida, pero sin consultas para obtener el consentimiento a la realización del proyecto en sí.

Además, el Gobierno ha cerrado la única oportunidad para la participación ciudadana contemplada en la legislación panameña, al permitir la aprobación subcategorizada de los Estudios de Impacto Ambiental de los sitios de reubicación con categoría de impacto nulo (Categoría I), los cuales no tienen espacio de consulta. Las reuniones han sido realizadas por la empresa, siguiendo sus propios intereses particulares, siendo éstas de carácter informativo, donde se les comunica a los Ngöbe cuáles son los planes de acción del proyecto.

Tercero, aquellas reuniones realizadas para la consulta de aspectos secundarios del proyecto, incluso donde han participado instituciones del Gobierno nacional, tampoco han garantizado que se cumplan los deseos y decisiones tomadas por la población indígena afectada. En numerosas ocasiones, dirigentes de la comunidad se han lamentado de que la empresa nunca cumple con las promesas realizadas y los acuerdos alcanzados si éstos no satisfacen las necesidades de AES o entran en conflicto con su calendario de construcción. Y el Gobierno ni siquiera ha garantizado que se cumpla con los procesos colectivos instaurados a posteriori.

B. El Estado Panameño causó daños irreparables al haber otorgado una concesión de territorio Ngöbe, incluyendo comunidades y fincas, a una empresa privada sin haber consultado y obtenido el consentimiento de las personas que vivían dentro.

En numerosas ocasiones, el Gobierno ha afirmado que es errado considerar la zona como territorio indígena ya que tiene categoría de área protegida. Si bien, estamos anuentes a que la zona se encuentra dentro del Bosque Protector Palo Seco (BPPS), hemos denunciado que es justamente a través de la creación de ésta área protegida, el Gobierno justifica la eliminación de los derechos territoriales de la población. A pesar que en el Decreto Ejecutivo No. 25 de 28 de septiembre de 1983 que crea el Bosque Protector Palo Seco, establece que en el área “se encuentran asentadas comunidades indígenas”; en aquel momento el Gobierno de Panamá no se esforzó en distinguir las tierras Ngöbe de las tierras del Estado, ni se les explicó a los Ngöbe que vivían allí que ellos no tenían más derechos de propiedad en sus tierras ni en sus cultivos. Es más, muchos de los habitantes locales no sabían en aquel entonces que el Gobierno había superpuesto un bosque de protección en sus territorios. El Gobierno no indemnizó a los Ngöbe por sus tierras en el Bosque Protector.

Adicionalmente, cuando el Gobierno creó la Comarca Indígena Ngöbe-Bugle mediante la Ley No. 10 de 7 de marzo de 1997, quedó en evidencia que esta delimitación no abarcaba la totalidad de la aspiración del pueblo Ngöbe. Existen numerosas comunidades  Ngöbe que quedaron excluidas por ésta delimitación legal, incluyendo aquellas a lo largo del río Changuinola. Esta ley además reconoció “áreas anexas,” que nunca fueron definidas en el espacio, pero que comprenden las tierras donde están ubicadas las comunidades dentro del Bosque Protector Palo Seco. El Estado tendría que haber demarcado las “áreas anexas” antes de otorgar concesiones en esta zona para proyectos de infraestructura. Cabe resaltar que el Estado contaba con fondos destinados especialmente a este objetivo a través del Programa Nacional de Administración de Tierras (PRONAT). Sin embargo, las áreas anexas aún están indefinidas, dejando a las comunidades fuera de la protección legal a las tierras y territorios indígenas. Esta situación se agravó cuando el Gobierno otorgó la concesión parcial de administración del BPPS a la empresa AES a pesar de la oposición presentada por la población que vivía dentro de la zona concesionada.

C. La metodología de negociación de AES va contra los usos culturales y aumenta la vulnerabilidad de las mujeres, niños y niñas y las familias con menos preparación académica y/o dominio del idioma español.

Desde el principio, el Gobierno ha tratado a las comunidades indígenas como si no fueran pueblos indígenas. En lugar de resguardar los derechos colectivos y territoriales de estos pueblos y exigir a AES negociaciones con cada comunidad a nivel grupal, ha permitido negociar con familias individuales y en algunos casos con un sólo miembro de la familia y hostigar o sobornar individualmente a los jefes de familia para obtener el consentimiento, aún cuando ellos no tuvieran la autoridad de renunciar a las tierras, ya que sus familiares también tienen el derecho de uso. Aunado a esto, AES con frecuencia determinaba qué miembros de la familia eran aptos para representar a una familia entera en el proceso de negociación, reuniéndose con miembros que se habían mudado a Changuinola y otras áreas urbanas y consiguiendo el consentimiento de ellos sin informar al resto de la familia. Este enfoque en la negociación generó conflictos entre familiares y vecinos y tensiones entre diferentes comunidades de la región.

Muchas de las indemnizaciones se han cumplido parcialmente y la empresa se reserva la única copia firmada de los acuerdos, brindando copias sin firmas a las familias Ngöbes, lo que les impide utilizarlas en acciones legales.

En varios casos, AES ofreció a hombres jefes de familia supuestas indemnizaciones de dinero y no nuevas fincas, en detrimento de la calidad de vida de las mujeres, niños y niñas, aumentando su vulnerabilidad. En la cultura Ngöbe, las mujeres usualmente no administran el dinero sino que es tarea de los hombres. Es decir, las mujeres de las familias donde se dieron estos acuerdos por dinero, pasaron de una situación donde tenían acceso directo a la tierra, a una donde pierden control de la subsistencia por no recibir otros terrenos.

A pesar que el Gobierno asegura que las luces eléctricas que instaló la empresa se utilizan sólo para facilitar el trabajo nocturno de construcción, este tipo de contaminación más los ruidos de la maquinaria han aumentado la presión psicológica sobre las familias Ngöbe. Esta situación de estrés y ausencia de sueño, los impulsan a rendirse ante los deseos del Gobierno para que acepten los pagos en efectivo y los acuerdos de reubicación.

D. El Gobierno de Panamá aun no ha presentado a las comunidades Ngöbes opciones apropiadas para su reubicación

Ni el Estado ni AES Changuinola han logrado garantizar que se les darán tierras de igual o mejor calidad que aquellas que perderán, cercanas a sus propuestos sitios de reubicación. En un reporte entregado a la CIDH en junio del 2008, un año después de iniciada la construcción, la empresa afirmó que el 79% de la población aún no tenía una solución sobre las fincas que perderán en el proyecto. Las comunidades han manifestado reiteradamente su inseguridad por la insuficiencia de terrenos de igual calidad a aquellos que van a perder en la zona cercana a donde habitan y sobre el acceso a las áreas, la cacería y la pesca, la calidad del agua, y la posibilidad de cultivar los alimentos que forman parte de la dieta Ngobe, en especial los tubérculos. Es importante señalar que por su topografía, las tierras que se inundarán en el valle fluvial del Changuinola, son aquellas más ricas y aptas para la agricultura, mientras que las que se encuentran por encima de la cota del lago tienden a ser pobres, erosionables y de alto riesgo de deslizamientos por la inclinación del terreno.

II. El Gobierno de Panamá ha permitido violaciones al derecho de libertad personal de los Ngöbe

En diciembre del 2007 la población Ngobe decidió realizar una protesta pacífica para llamar la atención sobre las numerosas irregularidades del proyecto. En lugar de respetar sus derechos a una seguridad física, la policía nacional empleada por la empresa, actuó violentamente contra la manifestación, que como resultado trajo lesiones en mujeres, menores de edad y adultos mayores. Una revisión del expediente de la investigación realizada por el Ministerio Público es sumamente reveladora: contiene las declaraciones de cinco miembros de la comunidad, las cuales todas se complementan sin contradicciones. Pero, dentro del mismo expediente existen por lo menos cuatro versiones distintas y completamente contradictorias de lo ocurrido, desde la perspectiva del Estado. Así, hay testimonios de una actitud pasiva de por parte de la población, otro dice que la población agredió a la policía con piedras y machetes. Lo cierto es que el médico forense que evaluó a algunas de las personas arrestadas, certifica lesiones causadas por objeto contundente.

La Policía lleva ya un año entero de presencia permanente, luego de que AES Changuinola firmara un contrato de vigilancia permanente con la Policía Nacional, donde la primera le paga a las unidades policiales por estar armadas y uniformadas en la zona de la concesión. A pesar de las aseveraciones del Gobierno que indican lo contrario, los Ngöbe sí fueron vigilados en sus movimientos durante el periodo poco después del los hechos del 3 de enero del 2008, como lo demuestran las fotos de la Policía requisando a la población. Además, la Policía ha realizado detenciones de las pocas personas que se han atrevido a defender sus fincas contra los métodos irregulares de la empresa. Adicionalmente, la Policía bloqueó la entrada de cualquier foráneo que deseara visitar la población Ngöbe. De esta manera, eliminaron la posibilidad que tenían los indígenas, que viven en una zona remota sin electricidad o servicio telefónico, de comunicarse con sus abogados, organizaciones de apoyo y medios de comunicación justo en el momento en que se incrementaba la presión que se ejercía sobre ellos para que abandonaran sus hogares y estilo de vida. Por último, como refleja la carta escrita por la alcaldesa de Bocas del Toro el 25 del marzo de 2008, la policía ha sido utilizada para amenazar a la población a firmar acuerdos con la empresa AES Changuinola.


Aclaran datos sobre reportaje de Camino de Cruces

Aclaran datos de reportaje

25 DE ENERO.

Por este medio me permito aclarar que la ley que creó el Parque Nacional Camino de Cruces es la Ley 30 de 1992, la que redefinió sus límites es la Ley 29 de junio de 1995 y la Ley 21 de 1997, que ordena la incorporación como parte del parque de los bosques de rica biodiversidad de lo que fue la antigua base militar de Clayton. La Ley 29 definió los límites del Parque Camino de Cruces utilizando coordenadas geográficas y puntos referenciales en campo, que permite con nuevas tecnologías ubicar los límites de una manera más certera.

Gallinazos en el Parque Nacional Camino de Cruces

Gallinazos en el Parque Nacional Camino de Cruces. Foto: A. Rodríguez

La información contenida en el reportaje del domingo 25 de enero de 2009 titulado: “Se pierden bosques urbanos”, indicó erróneamente que los límites mostrados en la infografía fueron definidos con la Ley 30 de 1992. Igualmente, indica que nosotros [Alianza para la Conservación y el Desarrollo] interpusimos una denuncia por delito ambiental ante el Ministerio Público, cuando lo que pedimos es una investigación que deslinde las responsabilidades del porqué estas tierras, que tienen bosques del Parque Camino de Cruces, pueden ser utilizadas para hacer urbanizaciones, cuando el área es forestal y debe estar protegida con la Ley Forestal, y bajo qué figuras estas tierras han quedado en manos privadas.

Con la noticia se aclara un poco quién detenta la titularidad de la tierra en disputa, mas eso no exime a la Caja de Ahorros o a sus “fideicomitantes” de la responsabilidad de proteger el estatus jurídico y ecológico del área, dado que esta parte del parque y la zona contigua es de amortiguamiento, donde una urbanización que desnaturaliza el área es contraria a estos fines supremos de conservación.

El Gobierno y sus funcionarios están obligados a cumplir el régimen ecológico de la Constitución Nacional, la Ley Forestal, las leyes que configuran el Parque Nacional Camino de Cruces, el Código Penal, de lo contrario se atienen a ser demandados administrativa y penalmente. La seguridad jurídica debe ser para la defensa del patrimonio nacional como lo son estos bosques urbanos y los que están dentro de los linderos del parque. Debe buscarse a todos los funcionarios responsables que han incumplido u omitido las leyes para permitir la enajenación y mal uso de estas tierras en los últimos 13 años.

Ariel Rodríguez Vargas
Alianza para la Conservación y el Desarrollo


Power, environment and indigenous peoples in a globalizing Panama

“I ENTERED DURING THE DAY, AND CAME OUT DURING THE NIGHT”:
POWER, ENVIRONMENT AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN A GLOBALIZING PANAMA

Osvaldo Jordán, University of Florida, Gainesville, and Alianza para la Conservacion y el Desarrollo (ACD), Panama.

For months now, the widow has clung to her tiny shack in this picturesque village above the Changuinola River — even when local officials and hydroelectric workers said she must leave, even when a bulldozer roared into her yard in the summer. “I will not go,” insists Isabel Becker, 59, a diminutive Ngobe Indian who lives in a dirt-floored home. “If the company wants to send police to kill me, go ahead.”[1]

The story of the Ngobe widow Isabel Becker, living in the Province of Bocas del Toro in Northwestern Panama, who entered at mid-day to an unknown business tower in Panama City, and was not able to leave that building until mid-night, may easily be interpreted as yet another of countless cases of local indigenous women being abused by the mighty power of corrupt governments and multinational corporations. For the casual observer, the same plot could be laid out in almost any country in the humid tropics: Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Brazil or Guatemala. Yet, under the surface of what Paul Farmer (2004) has avidly called the “ethnographically visible”[2], we can discover that the drama of Isabel is not simply an archetype of the continuous tragedy of indigenous peoples, but instead a reflection of a complex web of social relations, embedded in and creating of the legal framework of a national state that is simultaneously global and parochial, liberalized and oppressive, the booming Panama of the XXI century without the welfare state that sought for the protection of the Ngobe regime of de facto political autonomy in the 1970s.

Under this light, the story of Isabel is not yet another tragedy of any indigenous widow in a Third World country. Instead, the destiny of Isabel is an open-ended question about the place of the Ngobe womb in a globalizing economy, a question that demands a definitive answer from all of those who participate in this continuous struggle for power. In spite of the celebrated legal victories of indigenous peoples in Latin America, the case of Panama reveals a number of disturbing questions about the persistence of colonial relations between indigenous peoples and the descendants of the colonizers. The widow Isabel Becker appears not to have any place in a globalizing Panama of skyscrapers, beach resorts, and expanded waterways.

Changing citizen regimes in Latin America

The end of the Cold War prefigured profound transformations in Latin American societies. With the legacy of a code-based legal system, and what many observers would call the burden of patriarchal, Catholic authoritarianism, every Latin American country, with the possible exception of Cuba, embarked upon a double transition from state-control into market economics, and from top-down authoritarian rule into liberal democracy in the 1990s. Inimical to this “modernization” of Latin American society was the dismantling of those corporatist structures that maintained an ingrained intertwining of state and society.[3] The marriage between popular organizations and centralized governments, allegedly based on class distinctions, was expected to recede in the wake of free enterprise and equal citizenship. State companies should be disaggregated and sold to private investors who would not only bring new technology and capital investment, but improve efficiency and overall customer satisfaction. In general, the structural (and social) adjustment of the Latin American economies was associated with lifting restrictions against private initiative and individual accomplishment.

In spite of this Washington Consensus that promised citizen equality and personal liberty, many social scientists perceived an unexpected rise of assertive “new” indigenous movements that emerged from the foundations of previous class-based organizations, such as peasant leagues and worker unions.[4] The 1990 Ecuadorian “General Uprising” and the Bolivian “March to La Paz” symbolized the arrival of these new social movements of a postmodern Latin America, the expression of suppressed identities that had been sequestered by leftist guerrillas and Marxist intellectuals many years before.[5] Under this scenario, the legal recognition of special indigenous rights in several Latin American constitutional reforms – Nicaragua (1987), Brazil (1988), Colombia (1991), Ecuador (1998), Venezuela (1999) – was regarded as a major victory against the legal barriers that separated the descendants of the colonists from those of the colonizers.[6]

These new multicultural citizenship regimes granted special rights to indigenous peoples and Afro-Descendants without compromising the liberal principle of citizen equality and the sovereignty of the State.[7] According to the most renowned proponent of multicultural citizenship, Will Kymlicka; special indigenous rights should be acknowledged based on the historical claims of indigenous peoples (and in some cases Afro-descendants).

Although not all of the Latin American countries formally adopted multicultural citizenship regimes, constitutional reforms at the national level were also paralleled by the development of an international regime of indigenous rights, beginning with the enactment of ILO 169 and culminating with the 2007 United Nations Declaration on Indigenous Peoples.[8] Thus, even when national legislation did not explicitly recognize the rights of indigenous peoples, international human rights legislation bolstered their claims for territory and autonomy, as was demonstrated by the decisions adopted by the Inter-American Human Rights Court in favor of the Mayangna of Awas Tingni in Nicaragua and the Saramaka in Surinam. Even the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), harshly criticized and held responsible for the plight of indigenous peoples during the 1970s, officially recognized indigenous rights and enacted special guidelines for the protection of indigenous peoples in their development initiatives.[9] In legal terms, the multicultural revolution had been launched, and the new legislations promised to build a new framework for both citizen equality and cultural tolerance in Latin America.

In spite of the optimism of the 1990s, other social scientists have questioned the extent and the intent of multicultural reforms in the context of neoliberal government policies.[10] According to Hale, what he called neoliberal multiculturalism is not only an incomplete response to racial discrimination and social exclusion, but may actually hinder the development of more ambitious initiatives, imposing the terms of participation and suppressing the expression of what would be called “extreme” opinions.[11] According to Diaz Polanco (2006), multiculturalism is inimical to the construction of a global empire, in which the other is not only embraced, but refashioned by the forces of global capitalism.[12]

As a result of this discussion, the current literature gives us two different and even contradictory readings about the controversial relation between multiculturalism and neoliberalism. According to Yashar (1995) and Van Cott (2000), neoliberal reforms contributed to the rise of increasingly assertive indigenous movements that promoted multicultural constitutional reforms. According to Yashar, the transition from corporatist to neoliberal citizenship regimes threatened those de facto spaces of autonomy that were enjoyed by indigenous peoples, thus eliciting a response leading to the rise of indigenous mobilization. On the other hand, Hale (2002) and Diaz-Polanco (2006) regard multicultural policies as a compliment of neoliberal state domination – in the case of Diaz-Polanco as a new expression of bourgeois ideology complementary of neoliberal globalization.

However, is multiculturalism restricted to the advent of structural adjustment and neoliberal globalism, or can we also conceptualize the development of multiculturalism within a corporatist citizenship regime? Since the rise of indigenous movements has been conventionally associated with the 1990s, and therefore with the process of state reform along neoliberal lines, both groups of authors conceive of an inimical relation between multiculturalism and neoliberalism, either as an unexpected consequence or as an instrument of capitalism. In this paper, I propose that the development of multiculturalism should be regarded as independent development from advent of neoliberalism, yet that the formulation of multiculturalism within the framework of a welfare state is complimentary and conducive to the assertion of the power of the State in the neoliberal period. Thus, we should probable speak of multicultural corporatist citizenship and multicultural neoliberal citizenship as two separate, yet intricately related historical developments, both leading in many cases to the demobilization, co-optation and administrative management of indigenous activism. As a new dawn of constitutional reforms extends through Latin America, indigenous peoples and their advocates are seriously questioning the capacity of multicultural citizenship regimes, both corporatist and neoliberal, to accommodate ethnicity beyond the confines of mere cultural difference or what Stanley Fish labeled “boutique multiculturalism.”[13]

Puente del Mundo y Corazón del Universo

Although Panama has never officially recognized multicultural citizenship in the National Constitution, the country has historically been heralded as a pioneer of indigenous political autonomy in Latin America. With no powerful landed oligarchy submitting the native masses to coerced labor, the staunchly Liberal Panamanian merchant elite – the same that wore British robes in the mid-XIX century –advocated for equal opportunities for whoever capitalized the advantages that were provided by the cosmopolitan inter-oceanic passageway – Jewish, Chinese, Hindu, or Italian immigrants, they would all be welcomed in this land of unfettered opportunities.[14] In this respect, why should Panama be declared multicultural, like Nicaragua or Ecuador, if the country was by its very “nature” open to people of all “races”, faiths, and ideologies? In an intrinsically multicultural Panama, indigenous peoples and Afro-descendants, like European and Asian migrants, would all possess a corner in this crossroads of the world. No other time was this national myth more eloquently expressed than in the heated election for the presidency of the National Assembly in September 1999, when the new female President Mireya Moscoso eagerly awaited the results of the election between Afro-descendant Haydee Milanes de Lay from Darien and Kuna indigenous legislator Enrique Garrido from San Blas. Regardless of the final outcome favoring Garrido, Panama had accomplished its ultimate destiny as a country of equal opportunities for people of all racial and ethnic backgrounds.

With such a cohesive national myth, Panamanians have avoided explaining the virulent nationalism of the 1930s; the continued conflict between cattle ranchers and Ngobe indigenous peoples in Western Panama; and the Kuna insurrection of 1925, among other episodes of open ethnic conflict.[15] In particular, the Kuna insurrection of 1925 has been reinvented to signify the creation of an innovative Panamanian regime of indigenous political autonomy, and not as the violent reaction of indigenous peoples against the imposition of colonial rule by an assertive national state. The armed insurrection of indigenous leader Victoriano Lorenzo between 1899-1902 has also been transformed by nationalist writers into a “peasant” struggle against Colombian political domination. In spite of all the historical evidence supporting the claim that ethnic relations have been replete with different levels of political conflict in Panama, the hegemonic discourse of innate multiculturalism has permeated all layers of society, concealing a deeply skewed distribution of income in which indigenous peoples comprise the majority of the poor.

This historical legacy of uneven wealth distribution, that was associated with class, race and ethnicity, began fracturing the Panamanian political system in the 1960s, auguring an increased mobilization of indigenous peoples, peasant leagues, labor unions, student federations, and other popular organizations in the coming years.[16] In 1965, the proclamation of an independent Ngobe republic by the leaders of the Mama Tata revival movement reflected the malaise that plagued the country, only a year after student protestors had been massacred by US armed forces in the Canal Zone.[17] Like Isabel Becker of Charco de La Pava, the Prophet of Mama Tata, Delia Bejarano, was a Ngobe woman who was trying to draw the map of her own destiny. According to anthropologist Guionneau-Sinclair, she had recently left the banana plantations of Pacific Western Panama after many Ngobe labor organizers had been fired by the Chiriqui Land Company, a subsidiary of the United Fruit Company. An isolationist spiritual movement that was at the same time critical of the Ngobe traditions of poligamy, chicha[18] drinking and ritualized fighting[19], Mama Tata called for the separation of the Ngobe from the corruption of Spanish-speaking society.

For this reason, this movement sparked the political mobilization of the Ngobe who had been claiming for the legal recognition of their territorial rights during many years. After the unexpected death of the prophet in 1964, and the declaration of an independent Ngobe republic by her followers seven months later, the State response was the dispatch of a National Guard unit to the Ngobe territory under the command of Mayor Omar Torrijos Herrera. Here the official account of Guionneau-Sinclair took an unexpected turn. Mayor Torrijos refused to repress the Ngobe protesters and fostered a dialogue with the indigenous leaders, who eventually decided to recognize Panamanian sovereignty. Had Torrijos not become the “supreme leader” of Panama four years later, the overarching implications of this episode would have probably not only been forgotten, but grossly underestimated.


The Corporatist Legacy of the Torrijos Dictatorship

After an internal quarrel within the National Guard, Omar Torrijos Herrera emerged as the main leader of the so-called 1968 revolutionary process.[20] Like Velasco Alvarado in Peru, Torrijos redefined the contours of the State relations with indigenous peoples.[21] The persistence of indigenous territorial rights was formally recognized in the 1972 Constitution, and the Kuna exception was adopted as a national model of political autonomy. Torrijos committed himself to the creation of comarcas for the protection of the collective lands of all indigenous groups in the country. The personal, direct and even occasionally affectionate relations between Torrijos and several of the main indigenous leaders have been recorded in numerous anecdotes of real or imaginary encounters between Torrijos and these ethnic leaders. As controversial of a figure as Torrijos was, both a candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize and at the same time accused of human rights violations; after the 1981 plane crash in which he prematurely died, it would be impossible to decipher his real intentions for developing such a close association with indigenous leaders.

As the head of a military dictatorship, Torrijos was reputed for declaring that he was not with the Left nor with the Right, but with the Panamanian people. As a result, the Torrijos government was composed of the most disparate characters that anybody could ever imagine, from a US educated and later to become Vice-President of the World Bank, Nicolas Ardito Barletta, to some of the most renowned communist intellectuals in the country. The eclecticism of the Torrijos coalition reflected both its intent, and its inherent contradiction. The General tried to create a powerful State that would incorporate all different sectors of society based on group identities into a common struggle for national liberation and economic development. He came to practice what has been referred as corporatism in Latin American politics, ruling in response to organized groups both created and submissive to the national government. Under this model, the interests of indigenous peoples would be officially incorporated into state decisions, yet indigenous peoples would never be expected to act independently of government-defined national interests. In this regard, and in the context of Panama, the indigenous, and other corporate interests, would always be considered secondary to the principal goal of recovering the Canal Zone from the control of the United States. In the same token, the Canal Zone would be visualized as a national public good for the benefit of all Panamanians without any distinctions – the golden cup that was lost for many years and that would produce wealth for the rest of the country.

After the approval of the Panama Canal treaties in 1977, the second phase of the Torrijos government could be implemented, integrating the national territory into a coherent organic entity, in which all groups would contribute and receive benefits from the inter-oceanic passageway.[22] Indigenous peoples were certainly the poorest among all Panamanians, yet their territories were loaded with valuable natural resources that could be harvested for the welfare of the country. Timber, water resources for oil-free energy, and precious metals were all present in the Naso, Ngobe, Kuna, and Embera territories. Loyal to his promise, Torrijos would not demand the indigenous peoples to relinquish their lands using the threat of government repression. Instead, he directed his state bureaucracy towards the formal recognition of indigenous territorial rights through the creation of comarcas; yet he also expected that the indigenous peoples would contribute to the wealth of the nation by offering their natural resources. Apparently, Torrijos was not aware of the inherent contradiction of the policies that he was promoting; that once indigenous peoples were empowered and entitled to their lands, they would also be free to make their own decisions about the use of their natural resources, even against the alleged benefit of the rest of the country.

The bargaining approach promoted by the Dictadura con Carino[23] of Omar Torrijos led to the signing of the Farallon Accords, in which the Kuna of Bayano accepted that their ancestral lands be flooded for the construction of the Bayano hydroelectric project in Eastern Panama.[24] In compensation for this extraordinary sacrifice, the State would provide the Kuna with health facilities and potable water; and would protect the existing forests for the Kuna to maintain their traditional culture and continue with their subsistence economy. We would never know what the fate would have been of the Torrijos corporatist model of indigenous participation had his author survived into the 1980s; yet the future tensions that would be generated by this regime of corporatist citizenship were subsumed by the spontaneous expression of a Kuna woman during a meeting about the Bayano negotiations: Acaso Usted es Dios para prometer tanto” (Franciso Herrera personal communication). No new indigenous comarcas were created during the lifespan of Torrijos, and after his death, all the internal contradictions of his “revolutionary movement”, and all the disparate forces that had been subtly repressed by his military corporatism emerged with sufficient pressure to confront indigenous peoples against the government bureaucracy of the Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD).

A Struggle for Power: Indigenous Peoples against the Revolutionary Process

After the death of Omar Torrijos, his successors inherited many promises that were difficult to fulfill. Torrijos had committed his government with the Embera, the Ngobe, the Bugle and the Naso for the creation of new comarcas; yet he had also embarked the country into a path of development that would demand the same land, energy and mining resources that were contained in the indigenous territories.[25] During the first years after the death of Torrijos, the bureaucracy of the Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD)[26] engaged in simultaneous negotiations with the different indigenous groups for the creation of their comarcas and to obtain their approval for development projects. However, government officials soon encountered Ngobe opposition to the construction of hydroelectric projects in Tabasara and Teribe-Changuinola, and to the exploitation of the Cerro Colorado mines, located in the heart of the Ngobe Territory. As negotiations with the Ngobe stalled, the Government was only able to proceed with the creation of the Embera-Wounaan Indigenous Comarca in 1982.

The Ngobe negotiations collapsed in 1983 after unsolvable disagreements about the continuation of the Cerro Colarado mines and the limits of the comarca in the Veraguas region.[27] The failure of the negotiations coincided with a period of increasing turmoil in Panama, as the country approximated to the first direct general elections since 1968. General Manuel Antonio Noriega had defeated his main political opponents within the military, and was prepared for seizing control of the government in favor of his candidate, former head of the World Bank for Latin America, Nicolas Ardito Barletta.[28] In fact, the revolutionary process had continued a decisive movement to the right that started during the last years of Torrijos. In spite of the boisterous populism of the military regime, the Generals were fully aware that Panama would soon have to implement the structural adjustment measures of the Washington Consensus, in order to salvage the indebted economy that they had inherited from the pharaohnic projects of the 1970s.

Rather than preparing the stage for a controlled transition to civilian rule, the 1984 elections initiated a period of profound political instability as news spread that the elections had been rigged by the military.[29] Although the first structural adjustment package was eventually defeated when popular mobilizations appealed to the legacy of social conquests bequeathed by the military; the internal quarrel within the rank and files of the PRD further debilitated the legitimacy of the government. Combined with the burden of the debt crisis, this crisis of governance foreclosed any possibility of discussing the issue of the indigenous comarcas, and delayed even the promotion of the ambitious national development agenda of the 1970s, that included roads, dams and mining complex. During this period, however, the increasing participation of a new generation of Westerly-educated indigenous leaders in the ranks and files of the PRD, reinforced the corporatist structures that had been laid out by Torrijos and his leftist supporters – also called La Tendencia[30]. As the power of the military was eroded by brutal repression and accusations of corruption, most indigenous leaders remained loyal to the revolutionary process, hoping that the protection of their collective lands would be achieved through the creation of comarcas. In spite of all the unresolved controversies about the use of natural resources, these indigenous leaders assumed that the corporatist agenda would be resumed once the crisis with the United States was finally resolved. The onset of the American intervention to oust Noriega in 1989, however, did not lead to a new coalition between the government, indigenous peoples, and other group-based identities, but instead to a complete reinvention of the Panamanian State along the lines of privatization and individual civil and political rights. Under these circumstances, the odds were thrown against the continuation of any form of de facto indigenous political autonomy, and in favor of the private exploitation of natural resources by international corporations.

Indigenous Comarcas and Development Projects in the New Liberal Era

The phantom of structural adjustment resurfaced soon after the US Marines began leaving a war-torn and devastated Panama in 1990. The claims of PRD anti-imperialists were absolutely confirmed as they battled against the economic reform package of the first Minister of Economic Planning of the new democratic period, Guillermo Ford; and against George Bush himself during his infamous visit to Panama City in 1992.[31] Apparently, the party of the people was not willing to sanction the dismantling of the Torrijos legacy of corporatist governance, and was opposed to what they called the return of the oligarchic rule that had dominated the country before the 1960s. In this context, indigenous peoples resumed their political mobilizations, once again demanding the legal recognition of their territorial rights based on their group identities. In 1993, the Governor of Panama province was even held hostage by the Kuna of Bayano, who claimed for the fulfillment of the Farallon Accords and for the creation of their comarca seventeen years after the flooding of their lands by the rise of the Bayano reservoir.[32] Faced with widespread opposition at many different fronts, and covered with a mantle of illegitimacy coming from the US invasion, the postwar government of Guillermo Endara (1990-1994) adopted a conservative stance – the implementation of the Washington Consensus would only be advanced until the limits imposed by the political and social instability that had been left in the country by the US military action.

Paradoxically, and reminiscent of similar developments in Peru, Argentina, Bolivia and Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s; the party of the Torrijos Revolution, the PRD, inherited the mission to implement structural adjustment, and so they did with unexpected fervor. The new President Ernesto Perez Balladares (1994-1999) was commissioned with the daunting task of lifting the PRD out of the ashes of the US invasion. A former banker, minister of economy and entrenched Noriega rival, Perez Balladares moved the pendulum away from military corporatism and into what he called the “modernization” of the Panamanian economy. Under his neoliberal reforms, the promises of Torrijos to the Bayano Kuna were completely buried, as the Bayano Corporation was abolished, public utilities were privatized, and the former Directory of Community Development was eliminated. Even the Ministry of Economic Planning was transformed into the Ministry of Economy, signaling the disappearance of the welfare state of centralized planning and of state protagonism in national development.

As a well-educated adherent to neoliberalism, Perez Balladares, however, understood that private investment also required the creation of regulating institutions, like the Ente Regulador de los Servicios Publicos (ERSP)[33] and the Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente (ANAM),[34] that would guarantee free competition, the protection of individual citizen rights and business accountability. These moderating reforms, however, lagged behind the rapid elimination of government-owned corporations. Worried about the future of their collective lands in the midst of the accelerated private allocation of natural resources, the Ngobe and the Bayano Kuna increased their mobilization, which ultimately led to the creation of their respective comarcas through Law 10 of 1997 and Law 24 of 1996, respectively. How would these autonomous regimes fare in an era of private investment and deregulation?

The creation of the Ngobe-Bugle[35] and the Madungandi[36] comarcas during the Perez Balladares administration revealed the contested legacy of the Torrijos corporatist model. The same party that had defended national sovereignty and the incorporation of the marginalized populations in the 1970s had now dismantled public corporations and set the stage for the dominance of new private actors. In compensation for the Torrijos promises, or perhaps as recourse to demobilize the indigenous population, Perez Balladares had paid the historical debt to the Ngobe and the Bayano Kuna with the creation of the comarcas. However, his government had also ensured that article 48 of Law 10 of 1997 would limit the autonomy of the Ngobe by denying their right to decide on the use of natural resources; and that article 21 of Law 24 of 1996 guaranteed the user rights of the non-indigenous colonists that had invaded the Kuna lands after the construction of the Bayano hydroelectric project. Instead of receiving an unrestricted support from the party of the Revolution, indigenous leaders were forced to negotiate the terms of their political autonomy; and many indigenous leaders accepted these compromises as members of the PRD government party. Such a contradiction revealed the inherent limitations imposed by the persistent corporatist model of citizenship. In the 1970s, indigenous peoples were considered an integral part of the Revolution and loyal supporters of the anti-colonial struggles that were intimately associated with the welfare state of the dictatorship of Omar Torrijos; yet, in the 1990s they would be auctioned to the best bidder during the process of privatization.

The creation of the Kuna Comarca of Wargandi in 2000 by the presidential administration of Mireya Moscoso (1999-2004) during the congressional presidency of Enrique Garrido, marked the epitaph of the alliance between the national government and indigenous peoples. In spite of all the implicit references to multiculturalism during the inauguration of Moscoso, the aspirations of indigenous peoples conflicted directly with the projections of government officials for economic growth and national development. The development of hydroelectric infrastructure throughout the country, under a new modality of private investment, represented an imminent threat to the integrity of indigenous territories and to the worldview of indigenous peoples. The course of collusion of the 1970s had become the road to collision in the 1990s, and the future of Isabel Becker and of many other Ngobe widows would be pending on the unavoidable confrontation between the capitalist logic of the new liberal State and the resistance position of indigenous communities. In this process of dissociation, those indigenous leaders who had initiated their political careers during the heyday of the Torrijos model of corporatist citizenship would be captured by their double loyalties, exposed and discredited in the face of growing grassroots opposition to the privatization of their indigenous territories.


The Tabasara Hydroelectric Project and the Ephemeral Success of Neoliberal Multiculturalism in Panama

When the national government proposed the construction of the Tabasara hydroelectric project in the 1970s, there was widespread opposition to this government initiative among the Ngobe and mixed-blood peasant communities in the Province of Chiriqui. According to a contemporary anecdote, Omar Torrijos himself heard the complaints of the poor peasants and indigenous peoples. After a long conversation, the General put his hat on the table and declared that they should not worry, that this project would not be constructed (Berediana Rodriguez personal communication). In spite of the alleged commitment of the General, a few months after the privatization of the National Hydraulic Resources Institute (IRHE), a group of national investors decided to resurrect the two dams of the Tabasara Complex. The first of these dams, Tabasara I, would be located within the boundaries of the Ngobe-Bugle Indigenous Comarca, while Tabasara II was planned to be constructed downstream in lands owned by poor peasants.

When the descendants of the same peasant and indigenous leaders that talked to Torrijos finally realized the imminence of the Tabasara hydroelectric projects during the early months of the Moscoso administration (1999-2004), they began to mobilize to express their outright opposition to these projecst. For this, they sought for the assistance of two government institutions that had been established by Perez Balladares to protect citizen rights and to guarantee fair competition – the National Environmental Authority (ANAM), and the Office of the Ombudsman. During the public hearings that were part of the official consultation for the approval of the Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs), ANAM presided over a mockery of this participatory process. The promoting company used public relations techniques to sell the benefits of the projects to the impoverished peasants and indigenous peoples, including unwarranted promises of employment; and tried to utilize the wealthy landowners (latifundistas) to gain the support of the local authorities and to quell the opposition of the poor peasant and indigenous peoples (Berediana Rodriguez personal communication).

Considering the lack of receptivity of the National Environmental Authority (ANAM), the peasants and indigenous peoples reached for the support of the Ombudsman, – who happened to be from the region impacted by the projects, and request his help to contact the Indigenous Affairs Committee of the National Assembly. Thanks to these inquiries, on June 6, 2000, the communities organized a general assembly with the Ombudsman and the Indigenous Affairs Committee in the area affected by the Tabasara I hydroelectric project (Berediana Rodriguez and Adelaida Miranda personal communications). As the peasants and indigenous peoples expressed their grievances against the projects, the government officials began arguing among themselves and the meeting finished in the midst of discord and confusion. As a result of this quarrel, the National Assembly even opened an investigation against the Ombudsman for disrespect of the local congressman.

During the next few months, and with the assistance of the Ombudsman Office, the people affected by the Tabasara projects began filing complaints against ANAM with regards to the approval of the Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) (Berediana Rodriguez personal communication). The Administrator of ANAM even attended a second general assembly with the affected communities that was convened in the month of July. As part of their campaign to voice their opposition to the projects, the peasants and indigenous leaders began organizing demonstrations to block the Pan-American Highway. Although these demonstrations were violently repressed by the Police and extracted a heavy toll from the protestors, the blockades served to attract the attention of the national media, and to put pressure on the government authorities to look for a peaceful resolution to this conflict.

Although the peasants and indigenous leaders did not have any money to pay for legal actions, a private lawyer presented an amparo de garantias against the water concession that was necessary for the construction of the Tabasara II hydroelectric project (Berediana Rodriguez personal communication). This lawsuit was ruled favorably by the Supreme Court in early 2001, and the Court ordered the suspension of the water concession, arguing that the national government had violated the General Environmental Law that called for the consultation of indigenous authorities before the start of any development projects affecting their territories. The legal victory of Tabasara II was interpreted as a major step forward in the protection of citizen rights in Panama; since not even in Panama City, grassroots protestors had ever been able to obtain a favorable Court decision in similar situations. Soon after the adoption of this Court ruling, the investors also decided to halt Tabasara I. From that moment, Tabasara has become a main reference point for all grassroots groups that have struggled for the protection of their individual and collective rights from the abuses of the government and private investors.

In spite of the apparent success of the Tabasara movement, during the next few years, the Moscoso administration began the reinvention of the corrective mechanisms that had been established by the Perez Balladares administration (1994-1999). Government officials realized that the development of mining, hydroelectric, and residential projects could not advance without impediment, when they also had to protect individual and group rights in the midst of neoliberal modernization. As a matter of fact, a few years later, when the Naso of Bocas del Toro Province began expressing their opposition to the construction of the Bonyic hydroelectric project in their ancestral lands, the General Environmental Law had already been modified to eliminate those articles that guaranteed the rights of indigenous peoples to previous consultation. However, the Moscoso administration did grant the last major government concessions to indigenous peoples. Not only was the Kuna Comarca of Wargandi approved, but the government also enacted several other laws protecting indigenous rights. The Director of Indigenous Affairs, Marianella Martinelli was genuinely engaged in trying to resolve the lingering controversy of the Bayano hydroelectric project, and in approving the special laws for Embera collective titling and for the creation of the Naso Comarca.

However, as market agents realized that indigenous peoples would not necessarily embrace neoliberal modernization, the State adopted an unsympathetic position towards indigenous claims. Besides the abolition of the special provisions of the General Environmental Law; in June 2004, the National Assembly rejected the law proposal that created the Naso Comarca. The State was set for controversy, and indigenous peoples would not have the capacity to access the official networks of corporatist governance that were in place during 1970s. The remainder of this article will present two cases that demonstrate how the Government of Panama has been systematically foreclosing any possibility for the inclusion of indigenous peoples in state decision-making. These cases suggest that we have entered into a political vacuum, a condition of pervading uncertainty, in which indigenous peoples appear not to have any place in the Panama of the XXI century.

The Bonyic Hydroelectric Project and the Unfulfilled Promise of the Naso Comarca

Although the Ngobe and the Bayano Kuna comarca negotiations dominated most of the government discussions and media coverage about indigenous issues during the 1980s and 1990s; most Panamanian citizens ignored the existence of another group of distinct indigenous peoples living close to the border between Panama and Costa Rica, the Naso (also called Teribe in Panama and Terraba in Costa Rica). Before the Mizkitu invasions of the XVIII century, the Naso had constituted the most numerous indigenous group living in what today is the Caribbean Province of Bocas del Toro in Northwestern Panama. Their historical territory, and their ferocious resistance against the Spanish colonization, had been avidly recorded by the Franciscan missionaries that traveled from Costa Rica to evangelize this frontier.[37] For multiple reasons that have never been properly investigated, the Naso population declined drastically; and their substantial demographic recovery was not possible until the mid-XX century. By that time, the Naso territory had been drastically reduced to encompass only the Lower Teribe and the Upper San San river watersheds in Panama, as well as an isolated community in the Southern Pacific of Costa Rica.[38] The Naso had lost most of their vast historical territory, yet they had been able to maintain their language and their distinct form of political organization – a monarchy.

With such a reduced number of people[39], and hundreds of kilometers away from Panama City, the Naso enjoyed de facto autonomy and absolute control of their ancestral lands during most of the XX century. However, they would eventually be reached by the prolonged arms of the Torrijos Revolution.[40] During the 1970s, the Teribe-Changuinola watershed was identified as the most important national reserve for hydropower generation in the whole country. As a matter of fact, the revolutionary government had planned to develop this area immediately after the completion of the Bayano hydroelectric project. Since the Naso were also demanding legal recognition of their historical territory, once again Omar Torrijos committed himself personally with King Simeon Santana to grant comarca status to the Naso lands.[41] As Panama fell into political and economic chaos after the death of Torrijos, the promise of a Naso comarca, as well as the ambitious plans to build a gigantic hydroelectric complex in the Teribe-Changuinola, were left dormant for more than a decade. Only after the “economic modernization” of Perez Balladares had begun to appear in the horizon, were the Naso lands brought back to the memory of decision-makers in Panama City. As a matter of fact, even before the privatization of the government-owned electric company, Instituto de Recursos Hidraulicos y Electrificacion (IRHE), a group of local entrepreneurs had asked the Government of Panama for a concession to construct the first of the dams of the Teribe-Changuinola hydroelectric complex, that would be located on the Bonyic River, a tributary of the Teribe River.

The return of government plans to exploit the Teribe-Changuinola watershed for hydropower generation revived the Naso struggle for the creation of a comarca. Since the Naso had previously rejected the proposal of the Ngobe to form a single comarca, their collective lands were not included in Law 10 of 1997.[42] This confronted the Naso with the difficult challenge of negotiating a comarca of their own directly with the national government. The political tensions associated with the irruption of external actors in the Naso Territory, from government aid to the advent of the Bonyic Project, had ruptured the traditional political organization, creating a rift between King Cesar Santana and his nephew Luis Tito Santana.[43] After many months of internal disputes, Cesar finally recognized Tito as the legitimate King. Tito arrived with the promise that he would achieve the ultimate aspiration of the Naso, the recognition of their collective lands as a comarca. For this purpose, Tito recurred to the remnants of the corporatist governing structures that had been left by Torrijos, perhaps completely unaware than in this new period of neoliberal multiculturalism, the interests of indigenous peoples would be completely secondary to private investment and national economic growth.

In 2001, the World Bank approved a loan contract with the Government of Panama for a countrywide land titling program.[44] The Land Administration Program (PRONAT) involved the delimitation and demarcation of indigenous lands and protected areas, as a corrective measure to avoid the privatization of these collective areas by the voracious land market. The World Bank contractors and associated government bureaucrats expected that the protection of the Naso lands would proceed uneventfully, without any major hurdles. In fact, in 2003 the limits of the Naso lands had already been identified and mostly agreed upon by the Bank consultants, government officials, and Naso authorities. A few months later, draft legislation would be proposed to the National Assembly for the declaration of the Naso Tjer-Di Indigenous Comarca. Had unexpected events never occurred, the Naso lands would have probably been declared a comarca during the presidential administration of Mireya Moscoso, like had previously happened with the Wargandi Kuna Comarca in 2000. However, the unanticipated purchase of the Bonyic concession by the Empresas Publicas de Medellin (EEPPM), a Colombian utilities company, once again destabilized the Naso traditional governance structures, and in this case, led to a crisis of representation that would be much more pronounced, prolonged, and vicious than any previous conflicts in the Teribe River.

In November 2003, several members of the Naso Council[45] declared that they were opposed to the construction of the Bonyic Project without the creation of the Comarca, and accused King Tito Santana of having been bribed by the hydroelectric company.[46] Initially, the Naso tried to solve this controversy internally, and in February 2004, the different factions had agreed, with the help of the Ombudsman Office, to form an ad hoc commission to examine the questions of the Comarca and of the hydroelectric project. Unfortunately, King Tito decided to ignore this agreement, and a few weeks later, he removed the President of the Naso Council, Adolfo Villagra, and several other prominent Naso leaders from this ad hoc commission. In response, on May 30, the dissenting group called for a Naso General Assembly, and announced the overthrow of King Tito Santana, proclaiming his uncle Valentin Santana as the new King of the Naso. These events occurred only a few weeks after Martin Torrijos, the son of former General Omar Torrijos Herrera, had been elected as the new President of Panama. Even before the official transfer of power, however, in June 2004, the National Assembly voted against the law project that created the Naso Comarca. This congressional decision signaled a reversal of the previous government policy of protecting indigenous lands, and suggested that the historical alliance between the government and indigenous peoples had finally been broken.

In spite of the negative signs given by the National Assembly during the last days of the Moscoso administration, the election of another Torrijos as President raised incredible expectations among the Naso and many other indigenous peoples around the country. Before the transfer of power, the Naso held talks with indigenous leaders associated with the PRD and even agreed on the designation of the new Director of Indigenous Affairs of the Ministry of Government and Justice, Ngobe professional Jose Ignacio Rodriguez.[47] In addition, a few weeks before the swearing of the new government on September 1, the supporters of both Tito and Valentin Santana agreed on holding elections within the Naso community to solve the existing crisis of legitimacy. They expected that the new PRD authorities would certify the winner of these elections, a mechanism that had proven successful during the previous controversy between Cesar and Tito Santana.

During the first months of the Torrijos administration, the followers of Valentin Santana invited the national authorities to mediate in the Naso governing crisis.[48] As opposed to the very personal style of the late Omar Torrijos, these communications were never responded by the PRD bureaucracy. The supporters of Valentin Santana did not realize that the new administration had thrown its lots in favor of Tito Santana and of the Colombian company until late December. Then, both the Deputy Minister of Commerce, and the Deputy Minister of Government and Justice, participated in a special ceremony in the town of Changuinola to sign the compensation agreement between Tito Santana and EEPPM for the construction of the Bonyic Project. Confronted with such a betrayal by the same PRD party that they had trusted for several decades, the Naso leaders reclaimed their de facto autonomy regime, and forcefully expelled Tito Santana from the Naso Territory on January 5, 2005.

During the next months, government officials from the Ministry of Government and Justice finally began organizing elections within the Naso Territory.[49] However, these conversations stalled over the specific provisions of the electoral statute. Whereas supporters of Valentin Santana demanded the use of the same rules that had governed the election of Tito Santana, government bureaucrats insisted on the implementation of a new statute that would prevent several supporters of Valentin from participating in the elections, particularly young people under eighteen years. When no agreement was reached, and after several weeks of negotiations, the supporters of Valentin Santana decided to boycott the elections, claiming that they were in violation of Naso customary law (usos y costumbres). As a result, on April 3rd, Tito Santana as a sole candidate was reelected as King of the Naso, although with less than half of the voting population that was included in the electoral list that had provoked the entire controversy.

Since the elections did not solve, but aggravated the Naso conflict, the contours of the neoliberal multicultural State that had replaced the Torrijos corporatist model finally became entirely visible. When the followers of Tito Santana tried to occupy the Naso government headquarters in the community of Siey Llik, around twenty heavily armed police units were dispatched into the Teribe River by the national government to uphold this operation.[50] Reminiscent of Omar Torrijos Herrera forty years before, the police officer that was responsible for the armed contingent decided to dialogue with the Naso leaders and refused to forcibly evict the supporters of Valentin from the Naso government seat. As a result, the official inauguration of Tito Santana occurred in the backyard of a house located along the Teribe River, after which the “King”, his Council and the accompanying government delegation all traveled back to his place of exile outside the Naso Territory. Although the Police had refused to exercise the state monopoly over the legitimate use of force, the neoliberal multicultural State of the 2000s had demonstrated that in this struggle for power, the government was not willing to tolerate those indigenous leaders who challenged the sovereignty of the State, and instead would support leaders like Tito Santana who were subservient to the demands of international capital and government-defined national interests.

Although the supporters of Valentin Santana had previously appealed to those regulatory institutions that had been established by the Perez Balladares administration to defend citizen rights within a neoliberal governance paradigm; neither the Ombudsman Office nor the Public Services Regulatory Entity (ERSP) nor the National Enviromental Authority (ANAM) were ever capable of representing the interests of the Naso as if they were equal citizens, let alone protecting their special collective rights. The Ombudsman Office visited the Naso Territory and provided assistance for the peaceful resolution of the conflict during early 2004; yet when the controversy escalated, this Office did not have any effective means to protect citizen rights and/or special minority rights. The ERSP, that was created with the purpose of regulating public utilities, did not have any mandate to mediate in conflicts between private companies and people affected by development projects. Finally, the National Environmental Authority (ANAM) that could have rejected the Environmental Impact Assessment of the Bonyic Project, that was planned to be constructed within the Palo Seco protected area,[51] preferred to ignore the demands of the hundreds of Naso who traveled to the town of Changuinola to participate in the public hearing of the consultation in June 2005. As the State no longer provided the corporatist means of participation that characterized the period of the former Torrijos; and yet did not implement neither equal citizen rights (neoliberal) nor special indigenous rights (multicultural); the Naso leaders even threatened to renounce en masse to the party that they had supported for so many years, the Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD) of General Omar Torrijos and of his son, current President Martin Torrijos.

In 2005, the Naso continued expressing their opposition to the imposition of a King and of a hydroelectric project by the same neoliberal multicultural State that had rejected the creation of their comarca a year before. This tense situation could have escalated into more direct and serious confrontations had the international regime of multicultural rights not intervened to stifle the conflict. In July, and after several months of discussions, the Private Sector of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) decided to stop considering the financing of the Bonyic Hydroelectric Project.[52] The withdrawal of the Bank represented an unforeseen victory for the followers of Valentin Santana, and an unanticipated defeat for Tito, the national government and the Colombian company.[53] Facing an unresponsive neoliberal multicultural State, the Naso had sought for accountability and for the recognition of their special rights as indigenous peoples at the international level.[54] As the Ngobe widow Isabel Becker inadvertently continued tendering her cacao groves, the dark cloud that was looming over the heads of the last surviving Naso migrated northeast to the Ngobe Territory in the neighboring Changuinola River. As the thrust of capitalist development forbade the explicit recognition of the Naso de facto regime of political autonomy; the Ngobe that had successfully mobilized against the Teribe-Changuinola hydroelectric complex in the early 1980s, and who had been granted their comarca status in 1997, were expected to pay back for this favor to the successors of Omar Torrijos.


Teribe-Changuinola ten years after the Comarca: Redefining the Ngobe Struggle for Territorial Rights

“We are against the neocolonialism of the transnational corporations that try to destabilize politically and create complications in the economic life of the country, whenever they are confronted with the legitimate demands of the Sovereign in defense of its natural resources”.[55]

According to an unofficial story narrated by Ngobe grassroots leaders, the Ngobe of Valle de Risco in the District of Changuinola rejected the proposal to belong to the Ngobe-Bugle Indigenous Comarca when Law 10 of 1997 was finally drafted by the Perez Balladares administration. The position of the Ngobe of Valle de Risco angered many of the other Ngobe leaders who were struggling for their territorial rights, yet Valle de Risco and several other communities in the Changuinola and Bocas del Toro districts in the Province of Bocas del Toro were granted a special status as annex areas of the Comarca.[56] In spite of the decision allegedly made by the inhabitants of Valle de Risco and of the other annex areas, to part away from the rest of the Ngobe people, several Changuinola leaders have occupied very prominent positions in the now institutionalized Ngobe-Bugle governing structure.[57] Loyal to the legacy of Omar Torrijos, most of them were members of the PRD; and like the Naso of the neighboring Teribe watershed, they also had high expectations that the government of Martin Torrijos would favor the interests of indigenous peoples, as was vociferously proclaimed by his father and by other important PRD figures in the Province of Bocas del Toro. As a matter of fact, shortly after the transfer of power, several Ngobe leaders of Changuinola were assigned to key positions in the regional government bureaucracy, including the regional administrator of ANAM, Ngobe leader Valentin Pineda from Valle de Risco.

When a small company, Hydroteribe, S. A., organized the public hearings for the environmental impact assessments (EIAs) of three hydroelectric projects proposed in the main stem of the Changuinola River in the vicinity of Valle de Risco (Chan 75, Chan 140 and Chan 220); the Ngobe leadership was confronted with the same conflict of interests that had haunted a whole generation of indigenous leaders after the approval of Law 10 of 1997. Most of the people directly affected by the projects, including the Ngobe widow Isabel Becker, never attended the public hearings, and were completely unaware of the implications of these projects that were explained by chui who spoke the language of the Conquest.[58] Another group of more politically active Ngobe leaders had already organized large gatherings to oppose the projects since at least October 2004. Yet, there was also a critical sector of the Ngobe leadership that remained fully committed to what was sold as a “state” project, and who envisioned the benefits that would be provided for “the poor” by such an outpour of financial investment. Regardless of these internal divisions, the three hydroelectric projects appeared to be a fantasy until the moment that ANAM approved the EIAs in October 2005. A few months later, a major North American corporation, Allied Energy Services (AES) from Arlington, Virginia, would claim ownership of the three hydroelectric projects, and would walk hand in hand with government officials, including many Ngobe leaders, to promise benefits that would surpass any of the early utopias of General Omar Torrijos.

From the beginning, the Changuinola projects suffered from a pathology that would only be imaginable in the context of the persistent memory of Omar Torrijos among the indigenous population: They were sold simultaneously as government-sponsored state projects in the same corporatist tradition of the 1970s, yet as private initiatives originating from neoliberal economic modernization. As the former, the projects should be supported wholeheartedly by the government bureaucracy, including the Ngobe leaders and the local communities, in the same way that the Kuna and the Embera had relinquished their ancestral lands for the welfare of the nation during the construction of Bayano Project in the 1970s. However, as purely private initiatives, the State was not responsible for any compensations or liability negotiations, and government institutions would only be limited to a minimal regulatory role according to the Perez Balladares institutional reforms of the mid-1990s. As AES moved decisively into the Changuinola River, and visited the Ngobe communities with gifts and monetary offerings of all sorts, many of the indigenous leaders that were previously opposed to the hydroelectric projects began working for the Company; or receiving contracts for their lands, their houses, and for other kinds of services. The internal division among the Ngobe population reached its zenith in the Valle de Risco congress of May 2006, in which those who supported the hydroelectric projects were denied the opportunity to participate in the meeting by those who opposed hydroelectric development.[59]

The Valle Risco gathering also marked the moment of irruption of the neoliberal multicultural State into the Changuinola conflict. In this meeting, the people opposed to the projects announced a series of demonstrations at the dam sites (including Bonyic) on June 5, World Environment Day. A few days before this date, however, the Government deployed police forces all around the Changuinola District, searching for specific Naso and Ngobe leaders; and cordoned off the entrances to the communities of Valle de Risco and Nance de Risco to control access to the dam sites.[60] Although these government abuses were denounced to the Ombudsman Office, there has never been any official response from the Ministry of Government and Justice with regards to these irregular activities. During the upcoming months, and without the official participation of any government institution, AES began negotiations for the relocation of an estimated 100 families that would be “directly” impacted by the construction of the Chan 75 reservoir.[61] However, local government officials, including several Ngobe leaders, did participate in the public events organized by the Company, signaling that the projects had the blessing of the government as if they were state business.

According to Isabel Becker, on January 3, 2007, she and several of her family members were transported by AES representatives to Panama City for touring the capital. After some shopping in the morning, however, they were all taken to the headquarters of AES, where the widow Isabel, who does not speak Spanish and does not know how to read and write in any language, was asked to sign an agreement conceding her lands to the hydroelectric company. As Isabel struggled against her inevitable destiny, many hours passed before she finally accepted to print her thumb into a document that she could not understand. Many days later, Isabel would refuse to abide to this agreement, when AES employees insisted that she needed to leaver her place for safety reasons. During this prolonged stalemate, no government institution assumed any responsibility for the plight of Isabel, as well as of hundreds of other Ngobe who were being pressured to renounce to their land rights; not even the regional head of ANAM, Valentin Pineda, who supervised the nationally protected area in which Isabel lived and where the hydroelectric project was planned to be constructed.[62] Ironically, according to several community leaders, the Palo Seco Forest Preserve was the main reason that most Ngobe of the Changuinola River Watershed had been denied the opportunity to register their land rights years before. They had been told that they were living within a protected area.

The drama of Isabel grew increasingly tense, as the company maintained that she had to leave her property. Changuinola Mayor, Virginia Abrego, also an Ngobe, intervened in the controversy, at some point even holding Isabel against her will in her “new house” in the town of Changuinola.[63] Between July and October, many other government officials visited the widow, claiming that they represented the government and that Chan 75 needed to be constructed for her own welfare and for that of the rest of the country. In contrast with the Kuna and the Embera during the Torrijos years, no community meetings were ever held to discuss the relocation plans, and no public negotiations ever occurred between the government and the affected communities. The Ombudsman Office did visit the area in several occasions, but never took any commitment to act on behalf of Isabel or of any other of the Ngobe residents of the Changuinola River. The Ombudsman officials withheld the claims of the Company that this was an entirely private transaction between an illiterate Ngobe widow, who did not even speak Spanish, and a multinational corporation based in the vicinity of Washington, D. C. After many months of continued harassment and of unrelenting suffering, on October 19, Isabel finally accepted to print her thumb into a new agreement that like the previous document, she did not understand. Less than a week later, she would be escorted away from her farm by the National Police, while AES executives and government officials pompously celebrated the inauguration of the construction of Chan 75 in a nearby location. On October 19, the National Public Services Authority (ASEP), the successor of the Public Services Regulatory Entity (ERSP), had issued resolution AN 1228-Elec, declaring the Changuinola projects were of public and social interest.[64]

In contrast with the Naso relentless opposition to the same governing party that had allied itself with indigenous peoples in the 1970s, the Ngobe leadership had succumbed to a combination of government offerings, private enticements, and direct coercion. The same government that had promised to protect the indigenous lands as comarcas under the Torrijos regime of corporatist citizenship had now demanded the continued loyalty of indigenous peoples, even when government officials were negotiating their collective lands with private corporations. The Chan 75 hydroelectric project, and the tragedy of Isabel Becker, revealed the monstrosity of the neoliberal multicultural citizenship regime that had been adopted by the Panamanian State in the 1990s. Special indigenous rights and universal human rights would only be respected in the boutique fashion described by Stanley Fish (1997). Indigenous peoples would indeed make excellent characters for postcards and multicultural displays. Yet, confronted with the contradictory national/private interest of business and government, the institutional mechanisms established by Perez Balladares for the regulation of private investment and the protection of citizen rights would be rendered completely ineffective, and the collective land rights of indigenous peoples would have to be relinquished peacefully to the lures of money, or forcibly to the batons of the National Police.

Rolling back the State: Neoliberal Multicultural Citizenship and the Disempowerment of Indigenous Peoples in Globalizing Panama

The Tabasara hydroelectric projects became the main battleground for the newly empowered indigenous leadership after the creation of the Ngobe-Bugle Indigenous Comarca after by Law 10 of 1997. The projects had been conceived during the Torrijos era of corporate governance as an integral part of the government plans for the development of energy infrastructure (Gjording 1994), yet the peasants and Ngobe of Eastern Chiriqui Province argued that Torrijos himself had promised that these dams will never be constructed. The advent of privatization called for the development of these dormant energy resources, and peasant and indigenous leaders were not willing to give away their historical rights without any protest. At the beginning, they used the spaces that were provided by the neoliberal corrective mechanisms established by Perez Balladares. They opposed to the projects during the public hearings of the Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs), and they called for the newly created office of the Ombudsman to advocate for citizen rights in this controversy. As the neoliberal momentum placed into test the limits of these new institutions, an unexpected turn quelled the aspirations of the private investors and of the national government. As part of the emerging multicultural paradigm of the 1990s, Kuna activists had managed to introduce several articles in the National Environmental Law (1998) that echoed the main provisions of ILO 169. According to these articles, development projects could not be advanced inside indigenous territories without the free, prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples. The Supreme Court decision to suspend the Tabasara II hydroelectric project signaled both the triumph of a developing regime of neoliberal multicultural citizenship, and an early warning to the government and private companies that indigenous rights had the lethal potential to obstruct laissez faire policies.

During the next few years, government officials and private investors demanded the recentralization of state decisions in order to favor private investment and uphold the “national interest”. What would be the future of indigenous rights when all state provisions for the protection of universal individual rights and of special indigenous rights were systematically eliminated? Although King Simeon Santana was promised by Torrijos himself that their lands would be recognized as a comarca in the 1970s, and in spite of the World Bank provision of funds for the delimitation, zoning, and demarcation of the Naso indigenous territory, the thrust of capitalist development forbade the explicit recognition of the Naso de facto regime of political autonomy and the legal commitment that such valuable lands would continue under the collective ownership of this indigenous group. Confronted with the unresponsiveness of the national government, the Naso both reclaimed their de facto regime of political autonomy, and capitalized the opportunities provided by the international regime of multicultural rights.

The cases of the Naso and of the Ngobe of Western Panama illustrate the profound transformations that have been happening in the relations between indigenous peoples and national governments after the process of neoliberal state reform and structural adjustment. These economic and political reforms coincided with the development of an international regime of multicultural rights that impinged upon the Government of Panama even when the State had not explicitly recognized multicultural citizenship. In this regard, Panama followed the trajectory of other Latin American countries like Peru and Ecuador that had abandoned state-sponsored corporatist citizenship regimes and embraced multicultural citizenship in the process of neoliberal reform. For many authors, these dislocations provided an impetus for the increasing mobilization of indigenous peoples, and for constitutional reforms that incorporated notions of multicultural citizenship.[65] In spite of the significance of these “politics of recognition”, the adoption of neoliberal multiculturalism ultimately concealed the power inequalities that existed between indigenous peoples and other political actors, like multinational corporations.[66] Such a deceiving attempt at recognizing without empowering can be complicated by two aggravating situations that proved tragic in the last two cases described above.

First, the symbolic and imaginary persistence of notions of corporatist citizenship even during those situations in which the legal framework and the political praxis denounced the existence of a completely different playing field, the transition from the welfare state of the 1970s to the neo-liberal regimes of the 1990s. Initially, the Naso tried to recur to the corporatist structures of the 1970s, but when they felt betrayed by the PRD government, they reclaimed the de facto regime of political autonomy that had allowed them to survive through centuries of ethnic wars, Catholic evangelization, and the encroachment of international capitalism. In contrast, the Ngobe leaders of the District of Changuinola preferred to ally with the governing party, even when that implied abandoning a grandmother like Isabel Becker, leaving her alone to fight against forces that she could not even comprehend.

In addition to the persistence of corporatist loyalties, the collapse of those institutions that had been created by the neoliberal multicultural State to equilibrate the power of business and citizens left indigenous peoples vulnerable to the temptations of capitalism and to the violence of a State that was simultaneously absent and omnipresent. The violent repression in Tabasara and the dispatch of police forces to the Naso Territory was only the prelude to the outright occupation of the neighboring Ngobe Territory years later. Whereas state officials did not acknowledge any responsibility in the process of relocation of Chan 75, they actively participated in the siege of Isabel Becker, arguing that the project was important for her own benefit and for that of the “nation”. In contrast with Tabasara, the Office of the Ombudsman proved completely ineffective in the Teribe-Changuinola cases. The National Environmental Authority (ANAM) essentially delivered the management of the Palo Seco Forest Preserve to AES, and ignored the claims of the hundreds of Naso who traveled to the town of Changuinola to express their opposition against the construction of the Bonyic hydroelectric project in 2005. The Public Services Regulatory Entity (ERSP) never intervened on behalf of the people affected by the hydroelectric projects, and instead issued a resolution upholding the continuation of the Chan 75 project even after the case of Isabel Becker had become publicly known in the national and international media.

In Panama, the prospects for indigenous peoples under neoliberal multiculturalism are completely dismal. Not only are the corporatist mechanisms of popular participation of the former Torrijos years no longer available, but in these times of a new Torrijos, indigenous peoples have also been denied the possibility of equal citizenship rights or of special multicultural provisions beyond the mere recognition of cultural difference and boutique expressions of uniqueness. Under these circumstances, indigenous peoples have only been left with the collective titles that they had obtained during the period of corporatist citizenship, with the uncertain possibility of reaching to the international regime of multicultural citizenship, or with the alternative of recurring to their pre-existing regimes of de facto political autonomy. Yet, even these persistent spaces of autonomy are also increasingly under siege as the tentacles of private business and government bureaucracies extend into the comarca lands themselves.[67] The Naso decided to reclaim their de facto political autonomy in January 2005, following the examples of the Lacandon Mayas in 1994, the Ngobe in 1964, and the Kunas in 1925. Yet, the question still remains of how long would the neoliberal multicultural State tolerate these challenges to its purported national sovereignty, and when would they respond using what Weber defined as the monopoly over the legitimate use of force. Isabel Becker did not wait for this dreadful moment, and walking over the footprints of millions of indigenous women in countless places and endless times, she chose a dignifying exit of her beloved homeland, as opposed to the stoic voicing of her complains, or the humiliating loyalty of the Ngobe bureaucrats of the governing party. Since there is no place for her in the Panama of skyscrapers, beach resorts and expanded waterways; she would rather abandon her lands than betray her ancestors for the rewards of private payoffs or government positions.

Epilogue

In November 2007, seven Naso protestors were detained in the Teribe River as they blockaded the advance of the machinery of the Empresas Publicas de Medellin (EEPPM). The Company had obtained financing for the continuation of the Bonyic hydroelectric project, yet the Naso continued defending their de facto regime of political autonomy. In February 2008, three other people were taken to jail for the same reason, and as I wrote this paper, there were violent confrontations between the followers of Tito Santana and Valentin Santana over the continuation of the Bonyic Project.

In December 2007, hundreds of Ngobe protestors occupied the property that had formerly belonged to the Ngobe widow Isabel Becker trying to stall the continuation of the Chan 75 hydroelectric project. On January 3, they were violently repressed by the National Police that even persecuted protest organizers into the neighboring communities and in the mountains of the La Amistad Biosphere Reserve. After that date, the Chan 75 area has been permanently occupied by the Police, controlling access to the communities and escorting AES machinery to work on any Ngobe family property, even against the will of the legitimate owners of that land. On March 7, 2008, Alianza para la Conservacion y el Desarrollo (ACD) and Cultural Survival presented a petition to the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC) asking for the protection of the human rights of the Ngobe population of the Changuinola River.


[1] Ben Shors, Miami Herald, Oct. 2, 2007.

[2] Paul Farmer. An Anthropology of Structural Violence. Current Anthropology 45 (3) (2004) p. 305.

[3] Donna Lee Van Cott, The Friendly Liquidation of the Past: The Politics of Diversity in Latin America (2000) p. 3; Willem Assies, Indigenous Peoples and Reform of the State in Latin America, in The Challenge of Diversity: Indigenous Peoples and the Reform of the State in Latin America (Willem Assies, Gemma van der Haar & Andre Hoekema eds., 2000) p. 9-10; Deborah Yashar, Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Post liberal Challenge (2005) p. 65-66.

[4] Xavier Albo, 9 El Retorno del Indio Revista Andina (9) 2: 299-345 (1991).

[5] Kay B. Warren, “Indigenous Movements as a Challenge to the Unified Social Movement Paradigm for Guatemala” in Sonia Alvarez, Evelina D’Agnino & Arturo Escobar (eds.) Culture of Politics, Politics of Culture: Re-visioning Latin American Social Movements (1998). P. 165-169.

[6] See generally, Donna Lee Van Cott, The Friendly Liquidation of the Past: The Politics of Diversity in Latin America (2000); Willem Assies, Indigenous Peoples and Reform of the State in Latin America, in The Challenge of Diversity: Indigenous Peoples and the Reform of the State in Latin America (Willem Assies, Gemma van der Haar & Andre Hoekema eds., 2000); Deborah Yashar, Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Post liberal Challenge (2005).

[7] See generally, Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (1995).

[8] Donna Lee Van Cott (ed.), InDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA (1994) p. 6-8; see generally, Allison Brysk, From Tribal Village to Global Village: Indian Rights and International Relations in Latin America (2000).

[9] See generally, Jonathan A. Fox & L. David Brown, The Struggle for Accountability: World Bank, NGOs, and Grassroots Movements (1998).

[10] See generally, Charles Hale, Does Multiculturalism menace? Governance, Cultural Rights and the Politics of Identity in Guatemala, Journal of Latin American Studies 34: 485-524 (2002); Otero, Gerardo & Heidi Jugenitz, Challenging National Borders from Within: The Political-Class Formation of Indigenous Peasants in Latin America, Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 40 (5): 504-524 (2003); Otero, Gerardo, Global Economy, Local Politics: Indigenous Struggles, Civil Society, and Democracy, Canadian Journal of Political Science 37 (2): 325-347 (2004); Hector Diaz-Polanco, El Laberinto de la Identidad (2006) p. 23-56.

[11] Charles Hale, Does Multiculturalism menace? Governance, Cultural Rights and the Politics of Identity in Guatemala, Journal of Latin American Studies 34: 485-524 (2002).

[12] Hector Diaz-Polanco, El Laberinto de la Identidad (2006) p. 23-56.

[13] Stanley Fish, Boutique Multiculturalism, or Why Liberals are Incapable of Thinking about Hate Speech, Critical Inquiry 23 (2): 378-395 (1997).

[14] For a historical account of the development of Liberal cosmopolitanism as a dominant ideology in Panama, see Alfredo Figueroa-Navarro, Dominio y Sociedad en el Panama Colombiano (1821-1903): Escrutinio Sociologico (Editorial Universitaria 1982) p. 215-222; Peter Szok, La Ultima Gaviota: Liberalism and Nostalgia in Early Twentieth Century Panama (2001) p. 13-34;; Aims McGuinness, Path of Empire: Panama and the California Gold Rush (2008). P. 84-87.

[15] For a reference on the historical conflict between cattle ranchers and Ngobe indigenous peoples, see Francisco Herrera, The State-Indian Relations in Panama, 1903-1983 (1989) (Masters Thesis, University of Florida) p. 88-89. For a discussion of the institutionalization of discriminator practices against West Indians, Middle Easterners, and East Asians, see Thomas Pearcy, We answer only to God: Politics and the Military in Panama, 1903-1947 (1998) p. 88-89, and Peter Szok, La Ultima Gaviota: Liberalism and Nostalgia in Early Twentieth Century Panama (2001) p. 110-114; For a complete account of the Kuna Insurrection of 1925, see James Howe, A People who would not Kneel: Panama, the United Sates, and the San Blas Kuna (1998).

[16] George Priestley, Military Government and Popular Participation in Panama: The Torrijos Regimes, 1968-1985 (1986), p. 21-26.

[17] Francoise Guionneau-Sinclair, Movimiento Profetico e Innovacion Politica entre los Ngobe (Guaymi) de Panama, 1962-1984 (1988) p. 74-125.

[18] The term chicha refers to a variety of fermented drinks that are used by indigenous peoples in Latin America.

[19] The Ngobe tradition of ritualized fighting, or balseria, was the most important trans-kinship ceremony before the advent of the Mama Tata movement in the 1960s. For a complete ethnography of this cultural practice, see Philip Youg, Ngawbe: Tradition and Change among the Western Guaymi of Panama (1971) p. 204-212.

[20] Steve Ropp, Panamanian Politics: From Guarded Nation to National Guard (1982) p. 38-41; George Priestley, Military Government and Popular Participation in Panama: The Torrijos Regimes, 1968-1985 (1986) p. 26-27; Walter Lafeber, The Panama Canal: The Crisis in Historical Perspective (1989) p. 125-127; Carlos Guevara-Mann, Panamanian Militarism: A Historical Interpretation (1996) p. 106-109.

[21] Francisco Herrera, The State-Indian Relations in Panama, 1903-1983 (1989) (Masters Thesis, University of Florida) p. 94-99.

[22] Francisco Herrera, The State-Indian Relations in Panama, 1903-1983 (1989) (Masters Thesis, University of Florida) p. 107; Alaka Wali, Kilowatts and Crisis: Hydroelectric Power and Social Dislocation (1989) p. 16-17; Chris Gjording, Conditions Not of Their Choosing: The Guaymi Indians and Mining Multinationals in Panama (1991) p. 31-35.

[23] “Dictatorship with Love”.

[24] Alaka Wali, Kilowatts and Crisis: Hydroelectric Power and Social Dislocation (1989) p. 81-84; Stephanie Wickstrom, The Politics of Development in Indigenous Panama, Latin American Perspectives 30 (4): 48-49 (2003); Lynn Horton, Contesting State Multiculturalisms: Indigenous Land Struggles in Eastern Panama, Journal of Latin American Studies 38: 838-839 (2006).

[25] John Bort & Mary Helms (eds.), Panama in Transition: Local Reactions to Development Policies. Museum of Anthropology, University of Missouri, Columbia (1983) p. 3-16; Alaka Wali, Kilowatts and Crisis: Hydroelectric Power and Social Dislocation (1989) p. 16-17; Chris Gjording, Conditions Not of Their Choosing: The Guaymi Indians and Mining Multinationals in Panama (1991) p. 3-7, 31-35.

[26] The Revolutionary Democratic Party, or PRD, was created by Omar Torrijos himself in 1978 as part of the democratic opening that followed the signing of the Panama Canal treaties.

[27] Francisco Herrera, The State-Indian Relations in Panama, 1903-1983 (1989) (Masters Thesis, University of Florida) p. 113-115.

[28] Walter Lafeber, The Panama Canal: The Crisis in Historical Perspective (1989) p. 194-197.

[29] Walter Lafeber, The Panama Canal: The Crisis in Historical Perspective (1989) p.196-198.

[30] La Tendencia referred to a group of PRD members who identified themselves with Marxism-Leninism and other leftist tendencies.

[31] George Bush made a stop in Panama on his way to the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. He was greeted by large demonstrations, in which prominent PRD figures publicly protested in the streets against the 1989 US occupation.

[32] Lynn Horton, Contesting State Multiculturalisms: Indigenous Land Struggles in Eastern Panama, Journal of Latin American Studies 38: 842-843 (2006).

[33] The Ente Regulador de los Servicios Publicos (ERSP), or Public Services Regulatory Entity, was created through Law 26 of 1996, and became responsible for concessioning the provision of national public services, like electricity and telephone, and for protecting customers against the potential abuses of private corporations.

[34] The Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente (ANAM), or National Environmental Authority, was created by Law 41 of 1998, and became responsible for approving environmental impact assessments, enforcing environmental norms, and granting concessions for the use of natural resources, such as timber and water resources.

[35] The Bugle is a very small indigenous group (<10,000) with strong cultural affinities with the Ngobe. Therefore, they decided to conform a single comarca with the Ngobe. A similar request was turned down by another indigenous group, the Naso.

[36] The Bayano Kuna comarca was officially denominated Comarca Indigena Kuna de Madungandi.

[37] For infomation about the colonial history of the Naso, see Fernandez-Guardia, Ricardo 1969 Resena Historica de Talamanca. Imprenta Nacional, San Jose, Costa Rico; Gordon, Burton L. 1982 A Panama Forest and Shore: Natural History and Amerindian Culture in Bocas del Toro. Boxwood Press p. 39-40. p. 152-157; Castillero-Calvo, Alfredo 1995 Conquista, Evangelizacion y Resistencia: Triunfo o Fracaso de la Politica Indigenista? Editorial Mariano Arosemena, Instituto Nacional de Cultura p. 291-310.

[38] According to Gordon (p. 39),, this group had been relocated by the Franciscan missionaries in what today is the Costa Rican town of Terraba.

[39] Today the Naso number around 3,000 people.

[40] Jason Paiement, The Tiger and the Turbine: Indigenous Rights and Resource Management in the Naso Territory of Panama (2007) (Ph. D. Dissertation, McGill University) p. 64-66.

[41] Personal communication with Adolfo Villagra.

[42] Jose Cruz Monico (r.i.p) personal communication.

[43] Jason Paiement, The Tiger and the Turbine: Indigenous Rights and Resource Management in the Naso Territory of Panama (2007) (Ph. D. Dissertation, McGill University) p. 133-135.

[44] Project Information Document No. PID8082. Panama – Land Administration Project (PAPE 0595) (www.worldbank.org).

[45] Besides the King, the traditional Naso governance structure is formed by the Naso Council and the Naso Assembly. The Council is a special deliberative and advisory body composed of representatives of the eleven official Naso communities. The Assembly is considered the highest decision-making body, and is formed by all the Naso people who are considered adults according to Naso traditional norms.

[46] Jason Paiement, The Tiger and the Turbine: Indigenous Rights and Resource Management in the Naso Territory of Panama (2007) (Ph. D. Dissertation, McGill University) p. 135-143.

[47] Personal communication with Felix Sanchez.

[48] Personal communication with Felix Sanchez; Jason Paiement, The Tiger and the Turbine: Indigenous Rights and Resource Management in the Naso Territory of Panama (2007) (Ph. D. Dissertation, McGill University) p. 151-152.

[49] Jason Paiement, The Tiger and the Turbine: Indigenous Rights and Resource Management in the Naso Territory of Panama (2007) (Ph. D. Dissertation, McGill University) p. 156-159.

[50] Jason Paiement, The Tiger and the Turbine: Indigenous Rights and Resource Management in the Naso Territory of Panama (2007) (Ph. D. Dissertation, McGill University) p. 160-162.

[51] The Naso Territory overlaps with two nationally protected areas, the Palo Seco Forest Preserve and the La Amistad International Park (PILA). Both of these areas are part of the internationally-recognized La Amistad Biosphere Reserve. The Bonyic hydroelectric project was planned to be constructed within the boundaries of Palo Seco, and according to environmentalist organizations, this Project would also affect the ecosystems of the La Amistad International Park, which is also a UNESCO World Heritage Site.

[52] Letter of Robert Montgomery from the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) to Osvaldo Jordan (Alianza para la Conservacion y el Desarrollo), Aaron Goldzimer (Environmental Defense), and Jose Yunis (Natural Resources Defense Council).

[53] Jason Paiement, The Tiger and the Turbine: Indigenous Rights and Resource Management in the Naso Territory of Panama (2007) (Ph. D. Dissertation, McGill University) p. 163-167.

[54] For a general discussion about transnational advocacy networks, see Margaret Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (1998); for a discussion of the special policies of international banks towards indigenous peoples and environmental conservation, see Jonathan A. Fox & L. David Brown, The Struggle for Accountability: World Bank, NGOs, and Grassroots Movements (1998); and for current discussions about the internationalization of indigenous struggles, see Allison Brysk, From Tribal Village to Global Village: Indian Rights and International Relations in Latin America (2000).

[55] Omar Torrijos Herrera. Respuestas a Garcia Marquez. Ediciones. Reforma Educativa, Panama. 1975. Cited in Jose de Jesus Martinez. Ideario Omar Torrijos. Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana. 1982. p. 113. Translation by Osvaldo Jordan.

[56] Law 10 of 1997, Article 4; Law 69 of 1998, Article 8; Executive Decree 194 of 1999, Articles 12-14.

[57] Law 10 of 1997 provided for the creation of several official positions at the Comarca level, such as the Governor, caciques, congress presidents and council coordinators. Besides, international cooperation also produced important salaried positions that were usually occupied by Ngobe with strong political connections.

[58] The word chui refers to non-indigenous people, especially mixed-blood mestizos.

[59] Officially, the Valle Risco meeting was also expected to be attended by Naso and Bribri leaders, and was therefore called Naso-Ngobe-Bribri Congress. The Bribri is a different ethnic group that also lives in the Changuinola District between the Naso Territory and the Costa Rican border.

[60] Personal communication with Felix Sanchez.

[61] The ANAM resolutions approving the environmental impact assessments for the three projects established that Chan 75 should be constructed before Chan 140 and Chan 220. The number of people affected by the Chan 75 project has never been officially determined, and AES only takes into consideration the communities of Changuinola Arriba, Guayabal, Valle Rey, and Charco de La Pava.

[62] The Chan 75, Chan 140 and Chan 220 hydroelectric projects are also located in the Palo Seco Forest Preserve. Like in Bonyic, environmental organizations argue that these projects will not only affect this reserve, but the La Amistad International Park (PILA), a World Heritage Site that protects the headwaters of the Changuinola River. In spite of this argument, in May 2007, ANAM signed a contract with AES granting an administrative concession of 6,215 Hectares of the Palo Seco Forest for the construction of the Chan 75 hydroelectric project.

[63] That same day, July 21, 2007, a bulldozer had stormed into Isabel’s property. From the impression, she had fainted, and municipal authorities had taken her to the town of Changuinola supposedly for medical attention. After she left the physician, she was carried to a house in the outskirts of Changuinola that had been acquired by AES for her temporary relocation. After crying for the whole night, she was finally taken back to her house in the Changuinola River on the following day.

[64] Law 10 of 2006 had restructured the Public Services Regulatory Entity (ERSP) into the National Public Services Authority (ASEP).

[65] Donna Lee Van Cott, The Friendly Liquidation of the Past: The Politics of Diversity in Latin America (2000) p. 1-35; Willem Assies, Indigenous Peoples and Reform of the State in Latin America, in The Challenge of Diversity: Indigenous Peoples and the Reform of the State in Latin America (Willem Assies, Gemma van der Haar & Andre Hoekema eds., 2000) p. 9-16; Deborah Yashar, Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge (2005) p. 54-82.

[66] See generally, Charles Hale, Does Multiculturalism menace? Governance, Cultural Rights and the Politics of Identity in Guatemala, Journal of Latin American Studies 34: 485-524 (2002); Gerardo Otero, Global Economy, Local Politics: Indigenous Struggles, Civil Society, and Democracy, Canadian Journal of Political Science 37 (2): 325-347 (2004); Hector Diaz-Polanco, El Laberinto de la Identidad (2006) p. 32-56.

[67] In 2006, a group of North American speculators obtained a concession over the whole Caribbean Coast of the Ngobe-Bugle Indigenous Comarca. As the Damani Beach Project created divisions even among those Ngobe leaders loyal to the PRD, this dreadful precedent sent warning signs that indigenous collective lands were not safe even within the limits of the comarcas.

http://socsci.ucsd.edu/

Anam rechaza fallo sobre ambiente

TRIBUNAL DEL AGUA.MULTAN A LA EMPRESA AES CHANGUINOLA CON 10 MIL DÓLARES.

Anam cuestiona fallo sobre ambiente

Harley Mitchell Morán, director de Asesoría Legal de la Anam, considera que el fallo del Tribunal fue parcial.

Ambientalistas enviaron el veredicto del Tribunal a la CIDH. Allí también presentaron una demanda.

LA PRENSA
Proyectos cuestionados.

José Arcia
jarcia@prensa.com

El director de Asesoría Legal de la Anam, Harley Mitchell Morán, dijo ayer que el Tribunal Latinoamericano del Agua (TLA) se extralimitó en sus funciones porque permitió a la parte demandante –Alianza para la Conservación y el Desarrollo (ACD) y comunidades indígenas– presentar nuevas pruebas sin ofrecer oportunidad al demandado –Gobierno– de prepararse para refutar.

Mitchell dijo, además, que el Tribunal no se ciñó a lo establecido en el manual de procedimiento del organismo que, según el funcionario, establece que los dictámenes deben ser estrictamente sobre temas relacionados con la seguridad de acceso al agua y a la “salud” de los ecosistemas hídricos.

Según Mitchell, el fallo toca aspectos más relacionados con el orden público que con la gestión ambiental del Gobierno.

Sin embargo, el jurado en su resolución señaló que “pese a que el TLA recibió las pruebas durante la audiencia, no fueron consideradas en el proceso de deliberación”.

Lucía Lasso, directora ejecutiva de ACD, dijo que la decisión del TLA fue enviada el pasado martes a la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, en donde se presentó una demanda en contra del Estado por posibles violaciones a los derechos humanos de los indígenas, como consecuencia de los proyectos hidroeléctricos que se construyen en Changuinola, provincia de Bocas del Toro.

Mitchell dijo que en los proyectos hidroeléctricos de Changuinola se aplican las medidas de mitigación establecidas en el estudio de impacto ambiental y el principio de que “el que contamina paga”. Es por eso, dijo, que hace dos semanas la Anam multó con 10 mil dólares a la empresa Aes Changuinola por no controlar la sedimentación. La empresa dijo que el problema ocurrió por un defecto en los filtros, pero ya fue subsanado.

Observaciones al Informe del Estado en Relación a la Solicitud de Medidas Cautelares a CIDH

VIOLACIONES DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS

POR EL GOBIERNO DE PANAMÁ

CONTRA LAS COMUNIDADES INDÍGENAS NGÖBE

E INDIVIDUOS EN EL VALLE DEL RÍO CHANGUINOLA, BOCAS DEL TORO, PANAMÁ

Observaciones al Informe del Estado en Relación a la

Solicitud de Medidas Cautelares

Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos

MC-56-08

29 de julio de 2008

Peticionarios:

Cultural Survival

215 Prospect Street

Cambridge, MA 02139

617-441-5400 x. 16

elutz@cs.orgwww.cs.org

y

Alianza para la Conservación y el Desarrollo

Apartado Postal 0815-01458

Zona 4, Panamá

República de Panamá

(507) 223-9170
acd@acdpanama.org o acdpanama@gmail.com

www.acdpanama.org

por

Ellen L. Lutz, Esq.

Directora Ejecutiva de Cultural Survival

Introducción:

Los peticionarios presentan sus atentos saludos a la Honorable Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, y estamos agradecidos por la oportunidad de presentar nuestras observaciones que estimamos pertinentes a la respuesta de La República de Panamá a nuestra solicitud de medidas cautelares.

Se necesitan medidas cautelares inmediatas en este caso para prevenir más daños irreparables a las comunidades Ngöbes en el valle del Río Changuinola, incluyendo la destrucción de sus casas, fincas, vida comunitaria, cultura, y bienestar. Durante el primer año de construcción, muchas personas ya han sufrido daños físicos y emocionales como resultado de las acciones tomadas por AES con la aprobación del Gobierno de Panamá, especialmente desde enero 2008 cuando la Policía Nacional, contratada por AES, ocupó el área, y el trabajo se expandió a escasos cientos de metros de las comunidades de Charco de La Pava y Valle Rey. Se incrementó también el ritmo de trabajo a 24 horas al día, 7 días a la semana. Ninguna cantidad de dinero a ser pagada después de los hechos puede compensar a los Ngöbe cuya economía de subsistencia está basada en relaciones recíprocas y en interdependencia comunitaria, por las pérdidas que están sufriendo ahora y continuarán sufriendo a menos que esta Honorable Comisión tome medidas cautelares tal como solicitan los peticionarios.

I. En ausencia de medidas cautelares para detener la construcción de la Represa de Changuinola, los Ngöbes continuarán sufriendo daños irreparables.

Contrario a lo que afirma AES-Panamá, los daños irreparables se comenzaron a dar desde el momento en que entró la maquinaria de construcción e inició obras sin el conocimiento y consentimiento previo de las comunidades. Muchas personas, y en especial los niños y niñas, ya han sufrido daños físicos y emocionales irreparables, y muchos otros viven bajo la constante amenaza de ser reubicados a la fuerza. La destrucción de hortalizas familiares, causada por la construcción de la represa, ha provocado que las familias Ngöbe ya no puedan hallar sustento según su tradición. Todas las familias Ngöbe que viven en el área están bajo un constante estado de sitio por la Policía Nacional, la cual ha incurrido en abuso de autoridad, extralimitación de funciones, detenciones arbitrarias, restricciones a sus movimientos y actividades, e intimidación para presionarlos a firmar acuerdos o permitir construcciones en sus tierras agrícolas.

Además, las personas están siendo expuestas a peligros a la salud provenientes del polvo en el aire y detonaciones con explosivos a unos cuantos cientos de metros de sus casas, así como también la privación del sueño causada por el ruido y las luces que usan para la construcción nocturna. También están experimentando inseguridad y desamparo como resultado de la amenaza inminente de que todo su territorio será inundado. Adicional a esto, las negociaciones de AES Panamá, a través de pagos a las cabezas de familia, ignora las prácticas Ngöbe de tenencia de tierras y está causando estragos dentro de las familias y discordia dentro de la comunidad, al no tomar en cuenta la estructura social Ngöbe.

Desde que presentamos nuestra petición, el Gobierno se ha estado reuniendo con las comunidades afectadas, pero aun no ha anulado los llamados “acuerdos” entre AES Panamá y los jefes de familia. El Gobierno tampoco ha revocado el Artículo 5 de la resolución de EIA (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental) del 2005, la cual hace del proceso de reubicación un asunto puramente privado entre AES y las familias afectadas, sin que establezca claramente autoridad garante para que los derechos de estas comunidades vulnerables no le sean conculcados. También, las declaraciones del Gobierno y de AES de que lo que ofrecen es algo “mejor” que el estilo de vida tradicional Ngöbe están causando humillación, y no están tomando en consideración su identidad y tradiciones. El propósito de las medidas cautelares es detener situaciones de abuso antes de que puedan causar mayores daños, en vez de compensar a la víctima o a la familia de la víctima después del hecho1.

Tal como ha afirmado la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, su propósito es preventivo.2 Aunque usualmente se requieran en casos donde la vida u otros derechos de integridad física estén en peligro, tanto esta Comisión como la Corte Interamericana han reconocido la importancia de otorgar medidas de protección interinas pendientes a una decisión sobre los méritos en casos relacionados a la integridad física de los pueblos indígenas y su seguridad, lo sagrado que son sus tierras indígenas, y el control de recursos naturales que se encuentran en tierras indígenas.3

Además, al emitir medidas interinas de prevención, tanto la Comisión como la Corte han reconocido el daño adicional que resulta de la inhabilidad del gobierno de consultar con el pueblo Ngöbe antes de otorgar una concesión corporativa de sus tierras o recursos.

Al emitir medidas cautelares para proteger a los doce clanes Saramaka que habitan 58 comunidades a lo largo del Río Surinam, la Comisión hizo un llamamiento a Surinam de tomar medidas apropiadas para suspender todas las concesiones, incluyendo permisos y licencias para la tala y exploración minera y otros desarrollos de recursos naturales hasta que fuesen examinados los reclamos presentados por el solicitante. Como hemos mencionado en nuestra petición, la Corte posteriormente indicó que el desarrollo a gran escala que pueda tener un impacto sobre los territorios indígenas requiere no solamente de consultas, sino también del libre y previo consentimiento según las tradiciones y costumbres de estos pueblos.4

De forma similar, la Comisión Mundial de Represas, formada por especialistas de todo el mundo que investigaron más de cien proyectos hidroeléctricos, determinó algunos lineamientos que se deben seguir al construir estos proyectos para garantizar el bienestar de las poblaciones afectadas. Uno de estos lineamientos especifica que “la reubicación física debe ser planeada en base a cronogramas que se basen en las necesidades y mejores intereses de las poblaciones afectadas, y no en los requisitos de construcción y amenaza inminente de inundación.”5 En el caso de Chan 75, no se sigue este principio. Al contrario, se van removiendo a las personas y familias a medida que se requiere avanzar la construcción, sin obtener su consentimiento previo, libre, e informado.

A pesar de las afirmaciones del Gobierno de Panamá en su informe, las circunstancias presentadas en su petición inicial en este caso no han cambiado. Al contrario, tal como detallan las siguientes secciones, la situación se ha deteriorado aún más.

A. Las familias Ngöbes están sufriendo por el trabajo nocturno, el ruido constante de las maquinarias, las explosiones, y el polvo. Desde febrero, las comunidades de Charco la Pava y Valle del Rey soportan las molestias de ruidos de trabajo de construcción y explosiones hasta horas después de pasada la medianoche. Además, AES ha instalado gigantescas torres de alumbrado para realizar los trabajos nocturnos. Al ser personas acostumbradas a vivir en aislamiento, cuyos hogares estaban rodeados de vegetación y no contaban con carreteras, este tipo de ruido y luces está causando omnipresente insomnio en las comunidades de Valle del Rey y Charco la Pava.6 Aunque no se han realizado evaluaciones médicas para conocer los efectos que pudieran haber tenido estas actividades sobre la salud de las personas que ahora están viviendo a escasos metros del área de construcción, el Gobierno ha reiterado que no se puede detener la construcción. También, familias Ngobes han reportado a Lucia Lasso y a otros colaboradores de ACD que al tener la construcción y maquinaria constantemente a su alrededor, tienen que soportar de manera continua el polvo, y que varios niños pequeños han comenzado a sufrir de frecuentes e intensas enfermedades respiratorias.7

B. Las familias Ngöbes están sufriendo por los cambios en el río. Las mujeres Ngöbes, cuyas labores dependen del acceso al río, han denunciado a Lucia Lasso que están sufriendo por la disminución de la calidad de agua, debido a la sedimentación en las tomas de quebradas y ríos. Mencionan que el agua que beben ya no es igual de buena y que a menudo les toca lavar en agua lodosa. Los Ngöbes, especialmente mujeres y niños, transcurren largo tiempo en el río y conocen bien las zonas seguras y aquellas con fuertes corrientes. Pero los cambios hechos por los movimientos de tierra a la altura de Valle del Rey y del sitio de presa han provocado accidentes peligrosos. El 3 de julio de 2008, Ernesto López, maestro y dirigente de Charco la Pava, relato a Lucia Lasso el caso de Roselia Santos (Valle del Rey) que la semana anterior estuvo cercana a ahogarse tratando de rescatar al hijo de Genaro Palacios, que estaba siendo arrastrado por la corriente. Afortunadamente, no hubo víctimas fatales, pero las personas están preocupadas antes este nuevo riesgo.

Además, los hombres se han quejado a Lucia Lasso de que el transporte a través del río con canoa y canalete (especie de remo-palanca utilizado para impulsar los botes) es mucho más difícil debido a los cambios en la corriente, volviéndose más peligrosos por la creación de nuevos rápidos.8

C. Las indemnizaciones que AES ha ofrecido a los hombres Ngobes han causado daños irreparables en el bienestar de las mujeres Ngobes. En varios casos, AES ofreció a hombres jefes de familia supuestas indemnizaciones de dinero y no nuevas fincas.9 Esto va en detrimento de la calidad de vida de las mujeres, aumentando su vulnerabilidad. En la cultura Ngöbe, las mujeres usualmente no administran el dinero sino que es tarea de los hombres. Es decir que las mujeres de las familias donde se dieron estos acuerdos por dinero pasaron de una situación donde tenían acceso directo a la tierra a una donde pierden control de la subsistencia por no recibir otros terrenos.

Esta situación se agrava con el hecho de que en la sociedad Ngöbe, especialmente cuando se encuentran en situaciones de estrés, los hombres tienen serios problemas de alcoholismo.10 En una conversación entre Lucia Lasso y mujeres de la comunidad de Guayabal, entre las que participaron Melita Tera y Guillermina Fernández, el 1 de Julio del 2008, salió a relucir que ya se han dado varios casos de hombres que han perdido miles de dólares de la supuesta indemnización en los bares de las zonas urbanas de Almirante y Changuinola.11 Considerando que las familias están firmando documentos de manera apresurada por miedo a que lo puedan perder todo, la continuación del presente proceso de reubicación podría acarrear consecuencias totalmente incompatibles con la cultura o la auto-determinación de las comunidades Ngobe, lo que dejaría a las mujeres y a los niños en una situación de absoluta dependencia.

D. La población vive en una situación de miedo e inseguridad por la presencia policial. Desde enero de 2008, primero por orden del corregidor y luego por un contrato entre la empresa AES y la Policía Nacional, las familias Ngöbe viven bajo constante vigilancia policial. Como indica el reporte del Ministerio de Desarrollo Social (MIDES), sobre el Congreso del 30 de mayo de 2008, la población es objeto de requisas por parte de la policía, hecho que se aprecia en una de las fotos donde varios individuos fueron interrogados mientras caminaban entre las comunidades. En las fotos también se aprecia el efecto de la policía en los niños, la mayoría de los cuales nunca los habían visto antes de la llegada de AES por no haber salido de sus comunidades.12 Varias madres de Charco la Pava mencionan como desde los hechos de enero varios niños lloran cada vez que ven a una unidad de la policía. Finalmente tanto hombres como mujeres se quejan de que la policía estacionada cerca del sitio de presa, al frente de la comunidad de Charco la Pava, se distrae en sus horas de trabajo vigilando con prismáticos a las personas, especialmente a las mujeres bañándose y lavando en el río.

II. El Gobierno de Panamá Continúa Violando el Derecho de las Comunidades Ngöbe de dar su Consentimiento Libre, Previo, e Informado Relacionado al Uso de su Territorio y su Reubicación.

A. El Estado no demostró haber garantizado un proceso de consulta adecuado para obtener el consentimiento previo, libre e informado de la población Ngöbe. La respuesta del Gobierno menciona haber realizado numerosas consultas a través de la consultora Gestión Urbana, empresa contratada por AES. A revisar las recomendaciones de la CIDH y las decisiones de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos resulta evidente que este proceso es inadecuado. La Comisión Mundial de Represas indica que uno de los requisitos para el desarrollo adecuado de grandes proyectos hidroeléctricos es la participación verdadera, la cual “necesita empoderamiento, esto es, capacidad de influenciar en las decisiones.” (resaltado nuestro)13 Esto, sin embargo no ocurre con las poblaciones Ngöbe del Río Changuinola. Primero, y más importante, muchas de estas reuniones se han dado a posteriori del otorgamiento de la concesión del Bosque Protector Palo Seco a AES Panama, y luego de iniciados los trabajos de construcción. En otras palabras, estas reuniones de consulta sólo evalúan aspectos secundarios al proyecto (por ejemplo el tipo de casa que desean sea construida), pero no se dieron consultas para obtener el consentimiento a la realización del proyecto en si.

Segundo, estos procesos de “consulta” no han sido mediados por el Gobierno de Panamá para garantizar los derechos a la participación libre e informada de sus ciudadanos de manera neutral. Al contrario, el Gobierno ha cerrado la única ventana de oportunidad para la participación estipulada en la legislación panameña al permitir la aprobación de los EIA de los sitios de reubicación con categoría de impacto nulo (categoría I), los cuales no tienen espacio de consulta. Las reuniones han sido realizadas por la empresa, siguiendo sus propios intereses particulares. Además, las reuniones son mayoritariamente de carácter informativo, donde se les comunica a los Ngöbe cuales son los planes de acción del proyecto.

Tercero, aquellas reuniones realizadas para la consulta de aspectos secundarios del proyecto tampoco han garantizado que se cumplan los deseos y decisiones tomadas por la población indígena afectada. En numerosas ocasiones dirigentes de la comunidad se han lamentado de que la empresa nunca cumple con las promesas realizadas y los acuerdos alcanzados si éstos no satisfacen las necesidades de AES o entran en conflicto con su calendario de construcción. Y el Gobierno no sólo no ha garantizado la participación y consulta previa, sino que ni siquiera ha garantizado que se cumpla con los procesos colectivos instaurados a posteriori. El último ejemplo de este accionar se ve reflejado en la carta enviada por Charco la Pava el 1 de julio de 2008 a AES.14

Aunado a esto se da el hecho de que la empresa, independientemente de cualquier reunión realizada, simultáneamente continúa las presiones individuales a las familias para avanzar a través de acuerdos separados . En virtud del Articulo 5, numeral 38, de la Resolución del EIA del 2005, los acuerdos de indemnización son un negocio puramente privado entre AES y las familias afectadas, lo que los haría irreversibles una vez hayan sido firmados.15

B. El Estado Panameño causó daños irreparables al haber otorgado una concesión de territorio Ngöbe, incluyendo comunidades y fincas, a una empresa privada sin haber consultado y obtenido el consentimiento de las personas que vivían dentro. El Contrato de Servicio de Vigilancia Policial firmado entre la empresa AES Changuinola y la Policía Nacional muestra que “el lugar de prestación del servicio, acuerdan las partes que iniciará y finalizará en LA EMPRESA.” El territorio Ngöbe pasó a formar parte de la empresa legalmente, hecho que se utiliza para justificar la vigilancia de sus propias personas y hogares.

El Gobierno reconoce en su informe que los Ngöbes afectados estuvieron viviendo en esta área mucho antes del establecimiento del Bosque Protector de Palo Seco (BPPS) en 1983. Además, el gobierno no discute el hecho de que cuando se estableció el BPPS, no consultó con los Ngöbes; ni tampoco tomó ninguna acción para identificar, demarcar, o titular las tierras Ngöbe; ni tampoco tomó ninguna acción para disminuir los derechos de posesión de tierras, hogares y territorio de los Ngöbe.

Hay que enfatizar que desde el 2001 el Gobierno contaba con fondos del Banco Mundial para realizar estas demarcaciones y legalizaciones del territorio indígena de Bocas del Toro a través del Programa de Administración de Tierras (PRONAT). Sin embargo hasta la fecha esta tarea aún no se ha realizado y todavía AES, en el EIA aprobado en el 2005, utilizaba un estudio de la ANAM que dice “existe una confusión por parte de los pobladores que creen tener derecho posesorio, pero en realidad lo que se da es derecho ‘sobreentendido’ (sin validez legal de propiedad) para la ocupación de la tierra, por lo tanto, se entiende que no es una propiedad privada y no se tienen derechos legales sobre estas tierras” (Énfasis es nuestro).16

Es un conocido y muy establecido principio de derecho internacional que el Estado tiene el deber de proteger los derechos de sus ciudadanos. En este caso, en vez de proteger los derechos del pueblo Ngöbe, el gobierno buscó contratar esta responsabilidad al asignarla a AES Panamá, una compañía de ingeniería sin ninguna experiencia o calificación en el tema de protección de derechos humanos. De hecho, AES ha actuado tal como se esperaría que una compañía de construcción actuara cuando trata de ejecutar un proyecto de obras públicas muy costoso: Ha tratado a los Ngöbe como un obstáculo en la construcción, en vez de tratarlos como un pueblo indígena cuyos derechos humanos está obligada a respetar.

El acuerdo contractual del Gobierno de Panamá con AES con respecto a los derechos de los Ngöbes en el Bosque Protector Palo Seco fue en sí una violación de los derechos de los Ngöbe, ya que los privó de acceso al sistema de justicia que el gobierno ha establecido para proteger los derechos humanos. El Gobierno de Panamá ha ido aún más allá en permitirle a AES contratar el uso de la Policía Nacional para prevenir que los Ngöbe participen en cualquier forma de protesta relacionada a su oposición a la represa. El contrato entre AES y la Policía Nacional no especifica las funciones que pueden realizar estas unidades de policía, sólo especifica que deben estar armadas y uniformadas todos los días. Además, el Gobierno no ha investigado apropiadamente ni ha tomado ninguna medida disciplinaria en contra de las unidades policiales que han sido acusadas de incurrir en violaciones a los derechos humanos los días 3 y 4 de enero. Esta falta de investigación envía a la poblacion Ngöbe un mensaje de discriminación, impunidad y arbitrariedad en la acción policial. La empresa en numerosas ocasiones ha mencionado a la población que ya no tienen derechos porque el Estado se los traspasó a ellos.17 Y la presencia policial se ha utilizado para corroborar este hecho e intimidar a las familias a que firmen acuerdos.

A pesar de que el Estado Panameño niega en su respuesta que estos agentes estén cumpliendo órdenes de la empresa para intimidar a la población, las autoridades locales sí están anuentes a esta situación. Es por esto que el 25 de marzo del 2008, la Alcaldesa del Municipio de Changuinola pidió que se retiraran las unidades de policía de la zona, y menciona el caso de que una familia de Valle del Rey había sido visitada “por miembros de la policía quienes, frente a un funcionario de la Municipalidad, le gritaron con frases intimidatorios a estos humildes ciudadanos.”18

Igualmente, la Policía Nacional ha detenido el paso a la ciudadana panameña Lucia L. Lasso, de la organización no gubernamental Alianza para la Conservación y el Desarrollo (ACD) en dos ocasiones. La primera fue el 21 de febrero de 2008, en compañía de Pedro Abrego, un dirigente indígena Ngöbe, y de Cheri Kramer, ciudadana estadounidense. La segunda ocasión fue el 5 de marzo de 2008, en compañía de los ciudadanos costarricenses Ricardo Valverde, del Tribunal Latinoamericano del Agua, y Alberto Rojas, consultor de la Unión Internacional por la Conservación de la Naturaleza (UICN).19 Aunque esta medida de control policial ha disminuido desde que se interpuso la presente petición, las mismas limitaron de manera significativa la capacidad que han tenido las organizaciones de derechos humanos para documentar y dar seguimiento a numerosos casos que se han dado durante los últimos siete meses.

C. La metodología de negociación de AES aumenta la vulnerabilidad de las familias menos educadas. No todas las familias donde se realizará el proyecto tienen el mismo nivel educativo, ni el mismo conocimiento de la cultura occidental, dominio del idioma español, y manejo del dinero. De no otorgarse las Medidas Cautelares, el hecho de que AES continúe con su practica de realizar acuerdos privados en base a transacciones separadas con los supuestos cabeza de familia sólo llevará a que más de aquellas familias con poco conocimiento de las formas occidentales terminen en condiciones precarias luego de firmar sus acuerdos. Un ejemplo es el caso de Patricia Castillo, cuya familia fue reubicada en la zona de Finca 4. Ella ya firmó un acuerdo que no es revocable y cuyos daños ya está viviendo. Patricia puso su huella digital en el contrato entendiendo que el dinero que recibiría mensualmente era en concepto de alquiler de su finca. Sin embargo, el contrato lo que especificaba era pagos mensuales de indemnización por haber cedido su finca a AES.20 Hoy día, Patricia vive hacinada en una casa en un área urbana de las inmediaciones de Changuinola,21 y no tiene aún una finca de reposición.22 Otro ejemplo es el caso de Enoc Villagra, hijo de Fermín Villagra de Valle del Rey. Enoc, de 22 años, se ha visto obligado a abandonar sus estudios superiores en la ciudad de Changuinola para poder quedarse en casa con sus padres, ya que la empresa siempre aprovechaba cuando él que sabe leer y escribir no se encontraba para presionar y tratar de comprar el terreno de la familia.23

Hay que resaltar que el Gobierno ha mantenido su posición expresada en el Articulo 5 de la Resolución del EIA de 2005 de que la indemnización es un negocio puramente privado entre AES y los afectados. En consecuencia la firma de cada uno de estos acuerdos en potencia representa un daño irreparable e irreversible para estas familias que muchas veces no entienden los términos de la negociación y que no tienen dinero para contratar abogados que puedan anular los acuerdos o defender sus derechos en las cortes. Prueba de esto ha sido que la Empresa ya había firmado numerosos acuerdos antes de que se hubieran aprobado los EIAs de los cuatro sitios de reubicación que sólo incluyen la localización de las casas y no toman medidas para garantizar la sostenibilidad de la economía agrícola de subsistencia al no garantizar tierras de cultivos.

D. Existen Incongruencias en la Respuesta del Estado Panameño sobre la presencia y acción policial. Uno de los puntos enunciados en la petición fue el del maltrato a la población durante los hechos del 3 de enero de 2008, mencionándose el caso de Iván Miranda, un niño de 9 años que terminó con una nariz rota, y separado de sus padres. En la carta de la Dirección General de la Policía Nacional con fecha del 2 de junio, la Policía responde a esta acusación diciendo que antes de que se diera un enfrentamiento con los moradores una mujer salió con un niño sangrando por la nariz y que se le trasladó “junto a sus padres, al centro de salud más cercano”. Sin embargo, los documentos policiales realizados por la Policía de Niñez y Adolescencia al día siguiente de los hechos, 4 de enero de 2008, relatan una historia diferente. Una carta del Subteniente 10408, Didier Santamaría, para el Sub comisionado José Manuel Ríos, dice que “el niño Iván Miranda de 9 años quien resultó con lesiones en la nariz (sangrado) ocasionadas por alteraciones de la turba” (resaltado nuestro) estuvo detenido junto a otros niños y adolescentes. Igualmente, en el “Listado de los Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes en Situación Especialmente Difícil (Alteración del Orden Público)” se menciona la detención de Iván Miranda, hijo de Amalia Ábrego y Federico Miranda. Al mismo tiempo, la lista de todos los detenidos otorgada por el Estado muestra claramente que ambos de sus padres estaban también detenidos. Es imposible entonces que sea cierta la respuesta oficial del Estado del 2 de junio ya que el niño y sus padres no pueden estar simultáneamente en el centro de salud más cercano y en los centros de detención de Changuinola.

III. El Gobierno de Panamá aun no ha presentado a las comunidades Ngöbes opciones apropiadas para su reubicación o alguna otra resolución relacionada a este asunto.

Tanto el Gobierno como AES Panamá describen a los Ngöbe como una cultura atrasada a la que le iría mejor gracias a los favores recibidos de AES. Esta actitud oculta los verdaderos hechos: que tanto el Gobierno como AES han decidido proceder con la represa Chan 75 bajo cualquier circunstancia, sin importar el costo en términos de violaciones de los derechos de los Ngöbes. Esta actitud se manifiesta en su informe en el que se detalla la ubicación de las nuevas viviendas de los miembros de las cuatro comunidades. El Informe General del Programa de Reasentamiento “Comunidades del Río Changuinola” realizado por Gestión Urbana, empresa consultora de AES Panamá, es sumamente ambiguo sobre la reposición de las fincas a perderse. El informe dice en la sección 4.3.3, “Estado Actual del Proceso de Reasentamiento,” que el 79% aún no tiene una solución sobre las fincas que perderán en el proyecto. Las comunidades han manifestado en numerosas ocasiones su inseguridad por la insuficiencia de terrenos de igual calidad a aquellos que van a perder en la zona cercana a donde habitan. Igualmente tienen preocupaciones sobre el acceso a las áreas, la cacería y la pesca, la calidad del agua, y la posibilidad de cultivar los alimentos que forman parte de la dieta Ngobe, en especial los tubérculos.

Es importante señalar que por su topografía, las tierras que se inundarán en el valle fluvial del Changuinola, son aquellas más ricas y aptas para la agricultura, mientras que las que se encuentran por encima de la cota del lago tienden a ser pobres, erosionables y de alto riesgo de deslizamientos por la alta inclinación del terreno. Esta situación se agrava por la cercanía del proyecto al Parque Internacional La Amistad, donde la ANAM no permitirá nuevos asentamientos y uso de tierras. En ninguna parte del informe de AES y Gestión Urbana se indica la capacidad de cubrir la necesidad para aquellas familias sin acuerdos de reubicación (79%) con tierras de igual o mejor calidad que se encuentren cercanas a sus viviendas. No es sorpresa entonces que aquellas familias que según Gestión Urbana ya tienen convenios con la empresa sobre sus fincas (sección 4.5.1), hayan recibido términos muy desfavorables. Este seria el caso de la finca de la familia de Venancio Salina que está a 6 horas de su vivienda, dificultando sobremanera su uso diario para la agricultura de subsistencia.

Además, existen incongruencias en el cuadro de convenios de fincas firmados entre AES y las familias, ya que en la sección de observaciones confirma que la mayoría aún no cuenta con convenios. Esto indica que en realidad no se ha definido su situación, sino que simplemente han acordado abandonar sus fincas. Por otra parte, tanto el reporte del MIDES como Gestión Urbana admiten que las hijas de la Sra. Isabel Becker aún no cuentan con fincas de reposición, 10 meses después de su reubicación, a pesar de haberlas solicitado explícitamente en sus acuerdos.

El no saber que tipo de tierras les darán, y dónde se encontrarán, es una situación inadmisible para una población indígena que depende casi completamente de la agricultura de subsistencia. La presión del avance de la construcción hace que realicen acuerdos sin ninguna consideración sobre los impactos a largo plazo de la reubicación, llevándolos a situaciones de riesgo y vulnerabilidad. El hecho de que AES ni siquiera haya asegurado los medios de subsistencia de algunos de los casos mejor conocidos en los medios de comunicación, como el de Patricia Castillo; y que el Gobierno de Panamá aun este confrontando dificultades con el cumplimiento de los compromisos de la reubicación de Bayano que se realizó hace mas de treinta años, son señales preocupantes sobre el incierto futuro que le espera a las personas que están firmando acuerdos bajo condiciones de presión.

Finalmente, el informe de AES para el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores comenta que la empresa le dará a la población afectada tierras tituladas a cambio de aquellas que se perderán. Sin embargo aun no se ha cambiado la legislación Panameña que hacen inadjudicables y no titulables las tierras de donde viven los Ngöbe y donde se encuentran los presuntos sitios de reubicación. Por lo tanto, la aseveración de AES es falsa.

IV. Respuestas a otros Puntos Hechos por el Gobierno de Panamá o AES que no han sido cubiertos anteriormente en el documento.

Nos complace mencionar que el Gobierno de Panamá ha reconocido en su Informe que los pobladores que viven en el área que está siendo impactada por la hidroeléctrica Chan 75 son Ngöbe – uno de los pueblos indígenas reconocidos en Panamá. Como tales, ellos están protegidos por todas las leyes internacionales y domésticas relacionadas a los derechos de los pueblos indígenas.

Por otro lado, el Gobierno expone que los peticionarios no tomaron en cuenta la legislación panameña que regula la ANAM. Nosotros negamos esta posición ya que sí se menciona en numerosas ocasiones las irregularidades en el uso de la legislación ambiental panameña. Como se manifestó anteriormente, la ANAM no ha garantizado el cumplimiento de la ley que regula los Estudios de Impacto Ambiental (EIA) al aprobar estudios de impacto ambiental categoría I (de nulo o mínimo impacto) en zonas habitadas por grupos indígenas y que son a su vez áreas protegidas, ambos criterios que de cumplirse la ley obligarían a clasificar los EIA como de impacto significativo. Como se dijo, según la legislación ambiental, los EIA categoría I no permiten espacios de participación ciudadana. Pero, además de la problemática ya descrita, queremos hacer énfasis en que el Gobierno derogó de manera subrepticia la mayoría de los artículos de derecho indígena en la Ley General de Ambiente. La Ley No. 41 de 1998, o Ley General de Ambiente, era una de los pocos cuerpos de ley que especificaban ciertos derechos de los pueblos indígenas y deberes del Estado para con estas poblaciones, la mayoría ubicados en el título VII de la Ley. En el año 2000, la población Ngöbe y la población Bugle del Tabasará lográron ganar un caso en la Corte Suprema utilizando estos artículos. Sin embargo, en el 2003 la Asemblea Legislativs se aprobó la Ley 18, la cual a pesar de ser simplemente una ley de modificación de límites de corregimientos, utilizó su último artículo para derogar 5 artículos de la ley General de Ambiente, o Ley 41 de 1998.24 Entre los articulos derogados estan los artículos 63 y 96 que establecían el co-manejo entre la ANAM y las autoridades indígenas para la conservación de recursos naturales.

Además, se derogo el artículo 98, que les daba el derecho al “uso, manejo y aprovechamiento tradicional sostenible de los recursos naturales renovables, ubicados dentro de las comarcas y reservas indígenas creadas por ley”. Los otros artículos eliminados, el 101, y el 102, establecían que se requería la autorización de autoridades tradicionales competentes para el “aprovechamiento con fines industriales o comerciales de los recursos ubicados en tierras de comunidades o pueblos indígenas”, y que las comunidades indígenas “sólo podrán ser trasladados de sus comarcas y reservas, o de las tierras que poseen, mediante su previo consentimiento.” En otras palabras, el Gobierno ha eliminado las herramientas legales que existían anteriormente para defender los derechos territoriales de la población indígena.

Finalmente, los Peticionarios absolutamente rechazan las alegaciones del Gobierno de que nosotros:

  • No hemos entendido el estatus legal internacional de La Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos de los Pueblos Indígenas, si bien no es tratado, es una fuente importante para la interpretación de del derecho Inter-Americana de Derechos Humanos;

  • Erróneamente se utilizaron el concepto de “Comarca” o “tierra
    ancestral”, para denominar el territorio donde se construye la represa. Sin embargo, el artículo127 de la Constitución Nacional protege todas las tierras indígenas, y no sólo las tierras comarcales.

  • No hemos agotado remedios domésticos; o

  • Se nos prohíbe presentar esta petición porque ACD es un co-firmante de una petición ante la UNESCO para incluir al Parque Internacional La Amistad, como Sitio Patrimonio en Peligro. Esta petición se relaciona a los impactos ambientales y ecológicos y no a situación de los derechos humanos del pueblo indigena Ngöbe de la zona.

Nuestros argumentos en contra de estas alegaciones del Gobierno pueden ser encontrados en la petición. Peticionarios además rechazamos cualquier otra alegación o error atribuido a nosotros por parte del Gobierno de Panamá que no esté mencionado entre estas Observaciones.

V. Conclusión

Por todas las razones mencionadas en la Petición inicial y aquellas mencionadas en estas Observaciones, los Solicitantes respetuosamente solicitan que esta Honorable Comisión proteja inmediatamente los derechos del pueblo indígena Ngöbe, tal como es reconocido en la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos y en la jurisprudencia de la Comisión y en la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, al recomendar Medidas Cautelares solicitadas en nuestra Petición.

Respetuosamente presentado,

________________________________ 28 de julio, 2008

Ellen L. Lutz

LISTA DE ANEXOS

Correspondencia

Carta de Charco la Pava a AES Changuinola 1 de julio 2008

— La comunidad reclama a la empresa por no cumplir lo acordado frente a figuras del gobierno

Carta de la Alcaldesa de Changuinola al Sub-comisionado de Policía 25 de marzo 2008

La alcaldesa denuncia las acciones intimidatorias de la policía y solicita al Sub-comisionado que las retire del área.

Carta de Ligia Castro, Administradora General de la ANAM,

a Ariel Rodríguez, Presidente de ACD 10 de junio 2008

— La Administradora General de la ANAM afirma que las tierras en las que viven los Ngobe no son tierras indígenas por no encontrarse en comarcas y por ser área protegida. Confirma que las negociaciones entre la empresa y las comunidades son meramente privadas, sin participación del gobierno.

Testimonio de Sra. Isabel Becker

(transcripciones ngöbere-español) noviembre 2007

–La Sra. Isabel explica su experiencia de la firma de contrato, aceptando cuando se cansó de tener a las personas de AES todos los días en la casa y ver que le ofrecían una buena finca.

Reporte del Antropólogo Dr. Philip Young julio de 2008

Declaración Jurada de Lucia L. Lasso julio de 2008

Figuras (identificadas individualmente)

(Diagramas y photos sobre la situación actual en la zona)

Photografías de la Zona y Testimonios por Miguel Lombardo

(30 de Abril a 3 de Mayo de 2008)

Entrevistas – CD

Ernesto López (video) febrero 2008

–Este dirigente de Charco la Pava cuenta las principales preocupaciones de las comunidades Ngöbe del Río Changuinola.

Julia, Elsa y Patricia Castillo (hijas Sra. Isabel Becker) (audio) noviembre 2007

— Las hijas de la Sra. Isabel Becker comentan sobre su situación en las casas donde fueron reubicadas. Patricia Castillo cuenta como sucedió la “firma” de su contrato.

Adelaida Miranda (audio) enero 2008

— Esta dirigente mujer Ngöbe comenta su experiencia en los hechos del 3 de enero

Willi Abrego (audio) enero 2008

–Este residente de Charco la Pava cuenta su experiencia en los hechos del 3 de enero

1 Jo M. Pascualucci, “The Evolution of International Indigenous Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System” (La Evolución de Derechos Indígenas Internacionales en el Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos), Human Rights Law Review 6:2 (2006), 281, 315.

2 Caso de la Fundación Guatemalteca de Antropología Forense, Solicitud para Medidas Provisionales en Guatemala, Orden de la Corte del 4 de julio 2006, Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en “Considerando” párrafo 5. Ver también, Mayagna (Sumo) Caso Awas Tingni, Medidas Provisionales en Nicaragua, Orden de la Corte del 6 de septiembre 2002, Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, en “Considerando” párrafo 9.

3 Ver la Solicitud de de Medidas Provisionales adjunta a la Petición en p.38 et seq.; Ver también “Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District v Belize” (Comunidades Indígenas Mayas del Distrito de Toledo vs Belize) Informe No. 40/04 (2004); 13 IHRR 553 (2006) en párrafo. 8.

4 Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname (Caso del Pueblo Saramaka vs Surinam), 2007 Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (ser. C) No. 172 (28 de noviembre 2007), 134. La Corte citó en apoyo a una conclusión similar al Relator Especial de la ONU en la situación de derechos humanos y libertades fundamentales de los indígenas. Relator Especial de la ONU en la situación de los derechos humanos y libertades fundamentales de los indígenas, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, presentado según la resolución 2001-65 de la Comisión (Quincuagésima novena sesión, Doc. ONU E/CN.4/2003/90, Enero 21, 2003, p. 2, 66.)

5 Bartolomé, L.J., de Wet, C., Mander, H., Nagraj, V.K. 2000. Displacement, Resettlement, Rehabilitation, Reparation, and Development (Desplazamiento, Reubicación, Rehabilitación, Reparación y Desarrollo) Informe Temático WCD I.3 preparado como un insumo para la Comisión Mundial para Represas, Ciudad del Cabo, p. 46

6 Ver fotos Anexo No. 4.

7 Declaration Jurada de Lucia Lasso

8 Ibid.

9 Informe de Gestión Urbana sobre acuerdos de fincas (quinto cuadro de sección 4.5.1).

10 Ver Informe Suplementario del Dr. Philip Young

11 Declaración Jurada de Lucia Lasso

12 Ver el anexo “Figuras.”

13 Bartolome, L.J., de Wet, C., Mander, H., Nagraj, V.K. 2000. Displacement, Resettlement, Rehabilitation, Reparation, and Development (Desplazamiento, Reubicación, Rehabilitación, Reparación y Desarrollo) Informe Temático WCD I.3 preparado como un insumo para la Comisión Mundial para Represas, Ciudad del Cabo, p. 46

14 Ver Anexo Carta de Charco la Pava a AES Changuinola.

15 Carta Dirigida por Ligia Castro de Doens, Administradora General de la ANAM a Ariel Rodríguez, Presidente de la ACD. 10 de julio de 2008.

16 Montano, Minerva. 1999. Diagnóstico de Aspectos Sociales, Ambientales, Culturales y Económicos del Bosque Protector Palo Seco, Bocas del Toro. ANAM-PANAM

17 Entrevista realizada por Lucia Lasso a Adelaida Miranda, 4 de enero de 2008. Minuto 03:28. Entrevista realizada por Dawn Jones a Ernesto López, febrero de 2008, minute 05:53. Entrevista realizada por Feliciano Santos a Isabel Becker, 10 de noviembre de 2008, p. 3

18 Ver anexo, Carta dirigida por Virginia Abrego, Alcaldesa del Distrito de Changuinola al Sub-comisionado de la Policía Nacional de Bocas del Toro, José Manuel Ríos, 25 de marzo de 2008.

19 El Informe del Gobierno comenta que no se detiene el paso de las organizaciones y cita como ejemplo la entrada del Banco Mundial y de la Asociación para la Conservación de la Naturaleza (ANCON). Sin embargo, el primero es un entidad con financiaciones millonarias al Gobierno y que entró en la zona dos meses después de presentada la petición de medidas cautelares. La segunda organización no entró por vía terrestre, sino que por helicóptero, evitando así cualquier contacto con los sitios de la policía.

20 Entrevista grabada, “Hijas Sra. Isabel, parte 1”, minuto 20:20.

21 Informe de MIDES.

22 Informe de Gestión Urbana-AES.

23

 Declaración Jurada de Lucia L. Lasso

24 Ley 18 de 2003, la cual “Crea los corregimientos Las Lamas, segregado del corregimiento La Pitaloza en el distrito de Los Pozos, provincia de Herrera, y San Jose, segregado del corregimiento San Juan, en el distrito de San Francisco, provincia de Veraguas; modifica los artículos 22 y 64 de la ley 58 de 1998 y adopta otras disposiciones” República de Panamá, Gaceta 24,731 del 31 de enero del 2003.


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